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Eighty-two percent of public firms have golden parachutes (or “chutes”) 
under which CEOs and senior officers may be paid tens of millions of dollars 
upon their employer’s change in control. What justifies such extraordinary 
payouts? 
Much of the conventional analysis views chutes as excessive compensation 
granted by captured boards, focusing on the payouts that occur following a 
takeover. Those explanations, if they ever were complete, miss the mark today. 
This Article demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that chutes are less 
relevant to a firm during a takeover than they are before a takeover, 
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particularly in relation to firms that invest in innovation. Chutes assure 
managers of realizing the long-term value of their work, even if the firm is 
later acquired. As a result, managers are more likely to make specific invest-
ments in innovation whose value may not be realized for some time—but which 
are essential to sustaining long-term performance. Moreover, when granted, a 
chute’s expected cost is a small fraction of what may be paid, reflecting the 
real likelihood a payment will never be made. That cost is more than offset by 
the value of the specific investments in innovation that managers are now more 
likely to make. Consequently, granting chutes tends to increase the value of 
innovative firms—promoting, rather than jeopardizing, shareholder interests 
in such firms. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of chutes as a valuable tool in promoting inno-
vation is largely missing from the corporate law scholarship, with important 
consequences. Two, in particular, are the negative view of proxy advisors on 
chutes, and recent federal Say-on-Golden-Parachute legislation that mandates 
certain types of disclosure regarding chutes. We recommend changes that 
properly reflect the low expected cost of chutes and their positive effect on 
innovation. 
INTRODUCTION 
By all accounts, Robert Marcus, Time Warner Cable’s new CEO from 
January 1, 2014, hit the corporate Lotto. Less than two months after becoming 
CEO, Mr. Marcus agreed to sell Time Warner to its largest rival, Comcast, for 
$45 billion.1 Following the sale, Mr. Marcus would have received nearly $80 
million in severance pay, more than $1 million a day for the six weeks he was 
CEO before the agreement to sell.2 That payment—referred to as a “golden 
parachute” or, colloquially, a “chute”—is principally comprised of cash, 
accelerated vesting of stock and stock options, insurance and various other 
fringe benefits, and excise tax gross-ups.3 The obligation to pay Mr. Marcus 
would have been triggered under the terms of his employment agreement by (i) 
 
1 David Gelles, $80 Million for 6 Weeks for Cable Chief, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 
20, 2014, 8:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/for-time-warner-cable-
executives-billowing-golden-parachutes [http://perma.cc/JE24-KDWQ]. The deal, which 
was scrutinized by the Department of Justice, fell apart just before the agreed sell date. 
Roger Yu & Mike Snider, How Comcast, Time Warner Cable Deal Unraveled, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 25, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/04/24/how-
comcast-deal-to-buy-time-warner-cable-fell-apart/26313471/ [http://perma.cc/JM5K-
KR5D]. 
2 See Comcast Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 174 (Mar. 20, 2014). 
3 Id. at 174-75; see also infra notes 54-57, 68-86 and accompanying text for a description 
of common chute terms. 
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a change in control of Time Warner, and plus (ii) his termination without 
“cause” or departure for “good reason.”4 
Why did the Time Warner board authorize such an outrageous sum? One 
explanation for chutes is that the CEO controls the board, and using that 
control, she can personally benefit at the shareholders’ expense—either by 
protecting her job or negotiating an excessive payout, a windfall that fails to 
reflect actual performance, in the event of a takeover.5 From this perspective, 
chutes are evidence of the managers’ ability to influence the board—
controlling who is appointed to the board, as well as information about the 
company provided to the board6—in order to extract excessive pay.7 Yet, that 
explanation appears to be increasingly less relevant particularly as CEO 
control is on the wane.8 In fact, rather than blocking takeovers and entrenching 
managers, chutes are more likely to allay a CEO’s personal concerns over 
losing her job, making her less likely to stand in the way of a deal9 and more 
 
4 See Comcast Corp., supra note 2 at 167, 174; see also infra notes 68-74 and 
accompanying text (discussing double versus single triggers for chutes). 
5 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J. 
CORP. FIN. 140, 153 (2014) (suggesting that a short-term decline in stock price after a chute 
is adopted may evidence the chute’s effects on managerial slack and incentives for 
executives to sell-out target firms to potential acquirers); Peter C. Fiss et al., How Golden 
Parachutes Unfolded: Diffusion and Variation of a Controversial Practice, 23 ORG. SCI. 
1077, 1080 (2012) (observing the widely-held view that chutes are “inappropriate payoffs 
for an abdication of stewardship”); Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden 
Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 
185-86, 201 (1984) (describing the chute’s role in insulating managers, but rejecting that 
explanation in favor of finding that chutes have a favorable effect on managers’ reactions to 
takeover bids); Damian J. Mogavero & Michael F. Toyne, The Impact of Golden Parachutes 
on Fortune 500 Stock Returns: A Reexamination of the Evidence, 34 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 30, 
37 (1995) (finding that shareholders perceive chutes to be an unfavorable signal concerning 
executive influence over the board and entrenchment).  
6 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 80-82 (2004). 
7 See id. at 8. 
8 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 989 (2010) 
(“The CEOs of publicly held corporations in the United States are losing power. They are 
losing power to boards of directors that increasingly consist of both nominally and 
substantively independent directors. And, perhaps more so, they are losing power to 
shareholders. This loss of power is recent (say, since 2000) and gradual, but nevertheless 
represents a significant move away from the imperial CEO . . . .”). 
9 See Ellie G. Harris, Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm 
Shareholder Welfare, 21 RAND J. ECON. 614, 614-15 (1990) (analyzing chutes as a means 
to align shareholder and management incentives); Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their 
Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 39-40 (1988) (describing the conflict 
between shareholder and managerial interests in a takeover); Lambert & Larcker, supra note 
5, at 183-85, 201 (describing the incentive alignment hypothesis and finding some basis for 
it in their empirical analysis); see also Kenneth Small et al., Ownership Structure and 
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likely to remain with the firm during (and potentially after) a contest for 
control.10 
A related explanation is that large CEO chutes (coupled with chutes 
awarded to other officers and employees) deter prospective buyers by 
increasing the cost of an acquisition and, in turn, insulating senior managers 
from hostile bidders.11 If that once was the purpose, however, it is less relevant 
today. For a chute to be triggered, there must be a change in control of the 
target, meaning a change in the ownership of a substantial block of stock.12 Yet 
the recent rise of activist shareholders means that substantial influence can be 
exerted over a target’s board without shareholders conducting a traditional 
tender offer13 or owning enough shares to trigger a change in control.14 In 
 
Golden Parachutes: Evidence of Credible Commitment or Incentive Alignment?, 31 J. ECON. 
& FIN. 368, 381 (2007) (documenting empirically that the incidence of chutes decreases as 
managerial ownership increases, suggesting that they provide alternative means to align 
shareholder and management interests during a takeover). This is consistent with the reason 
many companies provide for adopting a chute. As one board noted, a chute “helps ensure 
that if a change in control is in the best interest of the shareholders, officers have appropriate 
incentives to remain focused on their responsibilities before, during and after the transaction 
without undue concern for their personal circumstances.” Baxter Int’l Inc., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 29 (Mar. 21, 2014). Chutes also help secure the flow of 
accurate information to the board by minimizing a manager’s incentives to manipulate 
corporate information (for example, by inflating corporate earnings) in order to reduce the 
likelihood of takeover. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FINANCE 304 (2006); see also Jensen, supra, at 21. Offsetting that benefit is the risk a chute 
will cause managers to accept a sub-optimal offer in order to realize the chute’s substantial 
payments. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 141 (suggesting that large chutes may give 
managers incentives to sell a firm even when not in the best long-term interests of the 
shareholders). But see Judith C. Machlin et al., The Effects of Golden Parachutes on 
Takeover Activity, 36 J.L. & ECON. 861, 875 (1993) (finding no evidence that managers are 
willing to accept lower takeover premiums in anticipation of the payout they expect to 
receive under the target’s chute). 
10 See 3 STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 3507 (6th ed. 2009). Chutes may reduce the risk a manager will 
accept a job offer from a competitor during takeover discussions by ensuring they are 
protected against any losses and also by including a non-competition provision. See 
CenturyLink, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 60 (Apr. 16, 2014). 
11 See Jensen, supra note 9, at 40; Lambert & Larcker, supra note 5, at 185-86, 201 
(describing but rejecting the wealth transfer hypothesis as not supported by the empirical 
results); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of 
Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 132 (1989). A small number of states 
prohibit a firm from authorizing chutes following commencement of a tender offer for its 
shares. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
13 See Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender 
Offers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 155, 155 (1986) (examining the contractual relationship between 
shareholders and managers, and how tender offers affect that relationship). 
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addition, chutes on average comprise only 0.31% of a target’s market 
value15—an amount that is hardly likely to stymie a determined acquirer.16 
Finally, even if chutes deter some takeovers, doing so may also enhance 
efficiency. Rather than a drop in value, shareholders of firms with CEO chutes 
typically receive a premium that is nearly double what shareholders of firms 
without chutes are paid.17 
Both explanations, therefore, seemingly miss the mark.18 Since chutes are 
triggered by a change in control, much of the conventional analysis has 
 
14 See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 53-55 (2011) (describing the rise and influence 
of activist hedge fund investors). Chutes typically define a change in control to require the 
acquisition of at least twenty-five percent of the target’s outstanding voting stock. See infra 
note 69 and accompanying text. Yet, as the Delaware Chancery Court observed in Third 
Point LLC v. Ruprecht, Civ.Act. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *47 (Del. Ch. May 
2, 2014), “a relatively small group of activist investors [can] achieve control [of a 
corporation], without paying a premium, through conscious parallelism”—parallel action by 
activist and other institutional shareholders without agreement among them to coordinate. 
See also Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 359 n.254 (Del. Ch. 2010), 
aff’d, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (unpublished table decision, 2011 WL 743427). 
15 See ALVAREZ & MARSAL TAXAND, LLC, EXECUTIVE CHANGE IN CONTROL REPORT 
2013/2014 at 3, 4 (2014) [hereinafter ALVAREZ], http://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/sites 
/default/files/Change%20in%20Control.pdf [http://perma.cc/TB8B-H3J7]; see also Lambert 
& Larcker, supra note 5, at 181 tbl.1 (showing that chutes on average comprised 1.73% of a 
target’s market value from 1975 through 1982). 
16 See In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 709 (Del. Ch. 2001) 
(stating court’s reluctance to enjoin a transaction based on chutes, worth approximately one 
percent of the total transaction value, “that are relatively insubstantial in relation to the 
overall transaction at issue”); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., Civ. Act. No. 7956, 1990 Del 
Ch. LEXIS 162, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1990) (dismissing claim based on payments to 
directors and officers, since the payments “would [not] act as a material deterrent to either a 
proxy or consent contest . . . or even to a cash tender offer . . . .”). 
17 See Susan Elkinawy & David Offenberg, Accelerated Vesting in Takeovers: The 
Impact on Shareholder Wealth, 42 FIN. MGMT. 101, 102, 111 (2013) (finding that the 
premiums paid for firms with accelerated vesting of CEO stock and stock options was 
30.63% compared to 15.35% for firms without); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 
147-48 (finding a similar increase in premiums); Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a 
Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 170, 183 (2004) (finding that 
target shareholders can shift the cost of the chute to an acquirer who must include the 
chute’s payments in its bid price). As described supra at note 9 and accompanying text, by 
allaying a CEO’s personal concerns over losing her job, chutes are likely to increase the 
target management’s bargaining power vis-à-vis prospective acquirers, hence increasing 
shareholder gains from a change in control. 
18 There is also some evidence that introducing a chute corresponds to or signals a 
greater likelihood of takeover. See Jeffery A. Born et al., Golden Parachutes: Incentive 
Aligners, Management Entrenchers, or Takeover Bid Signals?, 16 J. FIN. RES. 299, 307 
(1993) (concluding that chutes signal an increased likelihood that a firm will receive a 
takeover bid); Lambert & Larcker, supra note 5, at 199 (determining that the favorable 
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focused on their payout and their effect on acquirers and targets at or about the 
time of a takeover. We provide a countervailing theory of chutes, with 
empirical support. As we explain, chutes are important whether or not a take-
over occurs, particularly in innovative firms. With chutes, managers are 
assured of realizing the long-term value of their work even if the company is 
acquired, and as a result, they are more likely to specifically invest19 in the 
firm.20 “Specific investment” refers to physical and human capital that has 
greater value when used in connection with a particular transaction, project, or 
firm than if used elsewhere. For example, buying a machine that is fully 
efficient only for a specific product would be a specific investment in physical 
capital, and investing time to understand the particular operations of a firm 
would be a specific investment in human capital.21 In addition, a chute’s cost at 
the time it is granted (its “expected cost”) is a small fraction of its later payout 
amount, reflecting the likelihood the chute will never be triggered, as well as 
the board’s ability to terminate managers who underperform.22 The expected 
cost is more than offset by the expected value of the specific investment a 
manager is now more likely to make.23 This explains why—notwithstanding 
Mr. Marcus’s apparent windfall—over eighty-two percent of firms have 
adopted a chute.24 
Encouraging managers to specifically invest in the firm is essential to 
creating and sustaining innovation and firm value over time. A new product or 
 
incentive effects of chutes improve as the probability of a takeover increases); Tatyana 
Sokolyk, The Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Acquisition Targets, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 
612, 625 (2011) (finding chutes and executive compensation plans are associated with a 
higher likelihood of takeover); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 143-45 (finding that 
firms with chutes face a greater threat of takeover). However, that fails to explain why the 
vast majority of public firms today have adopted a chute. It is unlikely that eighty-two 
percent of public companies anticipate being acquired, and the chute’s ubiquity calls into 
question its value as a signaling device. To be credible, a signal must be costly or otherwise 
capable of separating those who provide the signal from those who do not. See ERIC A. 
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19-20 (2000). 
19 We use the terms “specific investment” and “specifically invest” interchangeably 
throughout this Article. 
20 See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (stating that a chute acts as a “stipulated 
damages mechanism”). 
21 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 
52-56, 115 (1985) (describing different types of asset specificity). 
22 See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing a chute’s relative cost). 
23 See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (arguing that a chute’s net cost must 
take into account the profits derived from specific investments). 
24 See infra Figure 1 and accompanying text. Competition for talented CEOs must also 
be considered. All other things being equal, a talented CEO will prefer to join a firm that 
grants her a chute, particularly if the firm has a high probability of takeover. A chute can 
help attract more talented managers, ensuring them that they will retain the benefits of their 
specific investment, even upon a change in control See infra notes 164-69 and 
accompanying text. 
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a new approach to how a firm operates can create new business opportunities, 
increase market share, and enhance firm value.25 Managers are in the best 
position to assess specific investments due to their privileged access to 
company information,26 and in theory, they are personally interested in 
pursuing investments that enhance firm value (some portion of which they may 
later realize through promotion or higher compensation).27 In practice, how-
ever, differences between what managers know and what shareholders believe 
about a firm may distort a manager’s incentives. When evaluating management 
performance, shareholders tend to rely on changes in a firm’s stock price as an 
indication of change in fundamental value.28 The informational quality of 
market prices, however, weakens when a firm invests in innovation—new 
products or services that are not already offered in the market, in part because 
the market is less able to assess their value.29 As a result, shareholders are 
more likely to misinterpret a short-term drop in profits to be a sign of 
mismanagement when, in fact, it reflects the upfront costs of an investment 
whose value will not be realized until sometime in the future.30 Under the 
circumstances, the drop may cause shareholders to look to remove the board or 
sell their shares to a prospective acquirer.31 In either case, the firm’s managers 
face the risk of a new strategy that causes them to lose the value of their prior 
investments. Faced with that risk, managers are more likely to reduce their 
levels of specific investment, focusing instead on near-term performance, with 
the result over time being a decline in innovation and firm value.32 Chutes 
mitigate the likelihood of that outcome by insuring managers today against the 
loss of future value if there is a change in control. 
 
25 See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing how asymmetric information 
affects specific investments). 
27 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
28 This presumes, of course, that a firm’s stock price reflects all the information available 
about the issuer. In general, the current price of a security in an efficient capital market is 
the best estimate of a future price because the current price “fully reflect[s] all available 
information.” This idea is referred to as the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. See 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 383 (1970). 
 29 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered 
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 8, 52) (on file with authors); 
Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and 
Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621, 622 (2011) (explaining that the market may lack 
sufficient information to value intangibles); Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs of Financial 
Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft 2 (ECGI Finance, Working Paper No. 380/2013, 
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316194 [http://perma.cc/2JUE-
S7ZW]. 
30 See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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Our approach to chutes considers them from the perspective of value-
enhancing compensation. Classic agency cost theory tells us that tying 
management compensation to performance—“pay-for-performance” that 
rewards managers for good outcomes and punishes them for bad ones—will 
induce them to exert effort and improve productivity.33 Pay-for-performance, 
however, may have adverse consequences if the goal is to induce managers to 
explore new, untested investments, which are more likely to involve early 
failure and which shareholders are unable to accurately evaluate. Chutes 
address this concern by protecting managers against the inefficient actions of 
poorly-informed shareholders,34 rather than providing a means for managers to 
benefit from excessive compensation at the shareholders’ expense, as is 
commonly believed.35 
Consequently, chutes are less relevant to corporate governance and firm 
value during a takeover than they are before a takeover.36 To that extent, we 
argue that chutes and antitakeover protections—such as dual-class stock 
(indicating the presence of a controlling shareholder37), staggered boards, and 
poison pills—are partial substitutes for one another. Each limits the managers’ 
risk of the value of their investments later being expropriated.38 There is, 
however, an important distinction. Dual-class stock, staggered boards, and 
poison pills are traditional antitakeover devices that minimize the risk of 
expropriation by limiting the likelihood of a change in control.39 By contrast, 
 
33 The classic economic reference is Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 
10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 75-80 (1979) (modeling the principal’s monetary payoff as a function 
of both the agent’s unobservable actions (her effort) and a random state of nature, with the 
expected realization of the principal’s monetary payoff increasing with the agent’s effort 
level). 
34 “Rational myopia” studies have long highlighted that asymmetric information 
problems may result in managers taking actions that fail to maximize long-term firm value, 
in anticipation of inefficient shareholder actions. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, The New Theory of the Firm: Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 
80 AM. ECON. REV., May 1990, at 148, 148 (showing that the stock market is likely to 
misprice complex new projects); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient 
Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) 
[hereinafter Stein, Efficient Capital Markets] (modeling suboptimal managerial investment 
with poorly informed shareholders); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial 
Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63-67 (1988) [hereinafter Stein, Takeover Threats] (showing 
formally that managers react to the risk of a takeover by privileging actions that can boost 
stock prices). 
35 See supra notes 5, 11 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing the protection function of 
chutes). 
39 See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. 
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chutes are unlikely to deter takeovers,40 but they still assure managers that they 
will benefit from the long-term value of their work by serving as a kind of 
insurance against a prospective change in a firm’s investment strategy.41 Each 
encourages specific investment, but chutes provide the most direct means of 
doing so. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of chutes as a value-enhancing governance device 
is largely missing from the corporate law scholarship, with important 
consequences. Two in particular are the negative view of proxy advisors on the 
adoption of chutes,42 and recent federal Say-on-Golden-Parachute legislation 
that mandates disclosure and a non-binding shareholder vote on chute pay-
ments in any acquisition requiring a proxy or consent solicitation.43 We touch 
on both of those in this Article, recommending changes, consistent with this 
Article’s analysis, that properly reflect the low expected cost of chutes at the 
time of grant and their positive effect on innovation and firm performance.44 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of chutes and 
sets out our basic claim that chutes are a desirable means of promoting specific 
investment in innovation by managers. Part II sets out the empirical support for 
our claim, showing that adoption of chutes is associated with higher firm value 
in more innovative firms.45 Finally, in Part III, we highlight the problems that 
 
40 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
41 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 13.6.1, at 577 (1986) (“[T]his 
technique is more a form of insurance for managers than a true shark repellent.”). 
42 See infra Section III.A. 
43 See infra Section III.B. The laws and regulations include (i) Section 951 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1899 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b) (2012)) (amending the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding new Section 14A), which requires U.S. public companies 
to conduct a non-binding shareholder advisory vote on chute payouts in connection with 
mergers and other significant corporate transactions that are presented to the shareholders 
for approval, and (ii) Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t) (2014), which 
requires disclosure of any agreement or understanding (written or unwritten) between the 
target or acquirer and named executive officers of each concerning any type of 
compensation (current, deferred, or contingent) based on or otherwise relating to the trans-
action. 
44 See infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text. 
45 In a co-authored study, one of us has shown that adoption of a chute was negatively 
associated with firm value during the period 1978–2008, both in the cross-section and the 
time series. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate 
Governance, 110 NW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 30, 32) (on file with 
authors). In attempting to explain the negative association, the study notes that chutes—
similar to poison pills—can be adopted by directors without the need for shareholder 
approval. See id. at 5, 35. This “unilateral” feature, the study suggests, may make it more 
likely that entrenchment motivates their adoption, which, in turn, could explain their 
negative association with firm value. See id. Conversely, other defensive mechanisms, such 
as a staggered board and a supermajority requirement to amend the charter, require 
shareholder approval and, hence, seem less likely to be primarily motivated by managerial 
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arise when chutes are considered only in the takeover context. For proxy 
advisors, we propose an assessment of chutes that takes account of their 
contribution to firm value, and for federal legislation, we argue for a new 
approach to disclosure. 
I. INNOVATION, COMPENSATION, AND TAKEOVERS 
Chutes are important to corporate governance,46 but since they are triggered 
by a change in control,47 much of the conventional analysis has been confined 
 
entrenchment. See id. Consistent with this hypothesis, defensive mechanisms that require 
shareholder approval are positively associated with firm value in the time series over the 
period 1978-2008. See id. at 32. However, the study also notes that the new Say-on-Golden-
Parachute requirements may have weakened the unilateral nature of chutes, introducing a 
change that has the potential to result in chutes having a positive effect on firm value. See 
id. at 40-41; see also infra Section III.B (discussing Say-on-Golden-Parachute rules). 
Alternatively, the change in the effect of chutes on firm value may simply reflect changes in 
the terms of the chutes themselves. From 2007 to 2010, the percentage of chutes with a 
single-trigger declined, and the percentage with a double-trigger rose. Double-triggers are 
preferred by institutional investors since any payout requires both a change in control and 
termination of the beneficiary, causing the chute to more closely resemble an insurance 
contract against job loss rather than a windfall. See infra notes 70-72, 219-20 and 
accompanying text. Either reason may explain the difference in the relationship between 
chutes and firm value between 1978-2008 and 2009-2012. 
46 To date, the principal discussion of the role of chutes in corporate governance has 
turned on whether firms should resemble “democracies” (with control by shareholders) or 
“dictatorships” (under the control of managers). Those supporting the “democratic” model 
have argued that shareholders have the greatest incentives to maximize corporate profits. 
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 449 (2001). Accordingly, they contend, shareholders should have real authority 
over corporate decision-making. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 838-39 (2005) (arguing that enhancing shareholder power 
will improve corporate governance and increase firm value). From that perspective, the 
market for corporate control is essential to the efficient functioning of the firm, since it 
promotes managerial effort by exposing managers to the risk of being replaced. See Henry 
G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 
(1965) (explaining how mismanagement increases the probability of a future takeover). 
Antitakeover defenses—which, within the traditional framing, include chutes—shield 
managers from shareholder pressure and, therefore, weaken market discipline, making it 
easier for managers to pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense. See Lucian 
Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 784-85 
(2009) (refining the set of relevant shareholder rights to those most strongly correlated with 
increased firm value); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 
Q.J. ECON. 107, 126-29 (2003) (developing an index to measure the strength of shareholder 
rights and showing that firms with stronger shareholder rights (fewer antitakeover defenses) 
earn better returns than firms with weaker shareholder rights). By contrast, those who 
support the “dictatorship” model focus on the greater access of directors and managers to 
company information compared to shareholders and their better position to make informed 
decisions that benefit the firm. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
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to how they affect acquirers and targets at or about the time of a takeover.48 
Most corporate law scholars consider chutes to be excessive compensation,49 
as well as an entrenchment device granted by captured boards,50 partly in light 
of the costs an acquirer must incur if a chute is triggered.51 From that 
perspective, directors grant chutes in order to reduce the likelihood of a change 
in control—an odd response, if true, since a chute’s payments are quite small 
compared to the total purchase price a prospective acquirer must pay.52 
In this Part, we begin by providing an overview of chutes and their principal 
features. We then turn to a theoretical analysis of chutes, arguing that the 
conventional approaches are outdated and incomplete. Rather than influencing 
takeovers, chutes are principally designed to encourage managers to make 
specific investments in the firm—often in order to innovate new products or 
operations—whose results may not be realized until sometime in the future. 
Chutes do so by assuring managers they will benefit from the long-term value 
of their work even if there is a later change in control. In that respect, chutes 
are more likely to encourage long-term investment than incentives that 
compensate managers for current performance. We then offer a numerical 
illustration of our theoretical claim. This analysis forms the basis of our 
empirical study in the next Part. 
A. Institutional Background 
A typical golden parachute53 entitles its beneficiaries (usually the CEO and 
other senior executives)54 to specified payments following a change in control 
 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745-46 (2006) (arguing that a 
central decision-making authority, such as the board, is an essential governance feature in 
conditions of asymmetric information such as those in a public corporation); William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 653, 659-60 (2010). Under this model, antitakeover defenses—which, again, include 
chutes—benefit management decision-making and the firm by limiting intervention by less-
informed shareholders. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Repeated Auctions of 
Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity, with an Application to Takeovers, 19 
RAND J. ECON. 516, 518, 530-32 (1988) (modeling this function of chutes); Stein, Takeover 
Threats, supra note 34, at 75-76. In no case do proponents describe the role of chutes in pro-
moting specific investment by managers, a gap in the analysis that this Article fills. 
47 See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. 
49 See supra notes 5, 11 and accompanying text. 
50 In that respect, chutes traditionally have been described as complementing 
antitakeover defenses like staggered boards and poison pills. See infra notes 137-41 and 
accompanying text. 
51 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
52 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
53 In this Article, we distinguish golden parachutes from “tin parachutes,” which 
typically provide a lower level of benefits to a larger portion of the firm’s employees upon a 
change in control. See RADIN, supra note 10, at 3555. The board may adopt tin parachutes, 
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of their employer.55 Chutes specify which events will trigger a payment, as 
well as the form, amount, and duration of the payment.56 In addition to a chute, 
a CEO or other manager may be entitled to severance pay if terminated for 
reasons other than a change in control—for example, due to a failure to 
perform to the board’s expectations—although the size of the payment is likely 
to be smaller than under a chute.57 
Chutes emerged in the late 1970s and spread rapidly with the hostile take-
over wave that crested in the late 1980s.58 Takeovers created uncertainty for 
CEOs and others who began to worry about their jobs, and with good reason—
a survey at the time found that former CEOs held significantly lower positions 
 
although some states mandate that payments be made to employees who are terminated in 
connection with a change in control. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149 §§ 183(b), (c) 
(2014) (mandating two weeks’ pay for each completed year of service for employees 
terminated during specified periods before and after a change in control); 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 2581, 2582(a) (2013) (mandating one week’s pay for each completed year of 
service, up to a maximum of twenty-six weeks, less any other severance payments that are 
made, to employees terminated during specified periods before and after a change in 
control); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-7-19.2(b), (c), (d)(2) (2013) (requiring pay similar to 
Massachusetts, but applicable only to those employed for three or more years). 
54 Chutes typically extend to C-level executives (the chief executive officer, chief 
operating officer, chief financial officer, and chief legal officer), but they may also extend to 
executive vice presidents and others. See John M. Holcomb, Golden Parachutes, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIETY 1022, 1022 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2008). 
55 See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 5, at 200-01 (setting out an early study of chutes 
and their impact on managerial decision-making and shareholder wealth); Richard P. Bress, 
Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956 (1987) 
(proposing an insurance law framework to analyze moral hazard caused by chutes).  
56 See Subcomm. on Exec. Comp., Am. Bar Ass’n, Executive Compensation: A Road 
Map for the Corporate Advisor, 40 BUS. LAW. 219, 326-55 (1984) [hereinafter Road Map] 
(surveying various forms of executive compensation and providing guidance for practi-
tioners in setting up fair compensation). A chute’s terms may appear in individual 
employment agreements or in general agreements with standardized terms for a group of 
beneficiaries; protections against a change in control can also be found in equity plans, 
annual bonus plans, and retirement and deferred compensation plans. See Barbara Becker & 
Eduardo Gallardo, Golden Parachute Compensation Practice Pointers, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/02/golden-parachute-compensation-practice-
pointers [http://perma.cc/UX7M-76AU]. 
57 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 11 (reporting that fifty-six percent of CEOs and other 
named executives are entitled to severance upon a non-change-in-control termination; on 
average, the value of change-in-control payments is 1.4 times (for CEOs) and 1.3 times (for 
others) the value of non-change-in-control payments). 
58 See Fiss et al., supra note 5, at 1078 (examining how chutes varied in the course of 
diffusion in response to population- and organization-level influences). 
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within a few years following sale of their firm.59 Golden parachutes were the 
response. By the late 1980s, a majority of large U.S. public companies had 
granted chutes to their most senior executives.60 Today, eighty percent of the 
top 200 companies by capitalization provide some type of change-in-control 
protection for their most senior executives,61 with an average payment of 
approximately $30 million for CEOs and $10 million for other executives.62 
As chutes spread, so did popular concern over what was perceived to be 
exorbitant pay.63 In 1984, Congress enacted Sections 280G and 4999 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which impose a twenty percent excise tax on excessive 
chute payments and deny tax deductions to firms that award them.64 A 
payment is “excessive” if it equals or exceeds three times (3x) the employee’s 
 
59 See id. (citing a survey showing that most former CEOs of acquired companies ranked 
below the twentieth person in earnings in the new firm); see also Jay C. Hartzell et al., 
What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 49 (2004) 
(finding an overwhelming incidence of job loss for exiting CEOs, representing the end of a 
career for most CEOs). 
60 See Fiss et al., supra note 5, at 1078; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 140. 
61 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 8 (82% for CEOs and 78% for other named 
executives); see also infra Figure 1. Ninety-nine percent of companies have some type of 
change-in-control protection if their company-wide equity plans, annual bonus plans, and 
retirement plans are included. See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 7. Executives typically are 
eligible for benefits on the same terms as other employees under company-wide plans, even 
if the company does not maintain executive-only chutes. See, e.g., Texas Instrument Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 80 (Apr. 17, 2014) (disallowing individual 
chutes, but permitting executives to be eligible for the same change-in-control benefits as 
other employees). 
62 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 5-7. Twenty-one CEOs received chute payments of 
more than $100 million between 2000 and 2012. See PAUL HODGSON & GREG RUEL, GMI 
RATINGS, TWENTY-ONE U.S. CEOS WITH GOLDEN PARACHUTES OF MORE THAN $100 
MILLION 3 (2012), 
http://go.gmiratings.com/rs/gmiratings/images/GMIRatings_GoldenParachutes_012012.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VMS3-UTHF] (“These 21 CEOs walked away with almost $4 billion in 
combined compensation.”). According to a 2013 study, at least a dozen CEOs have chutes 
with protections worth over $100 million. See Jeff Green, Golden Parachutes of $100 
Million for Fired CEOs Outlive Outrage, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2013, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-06/golden-parachutes-of-100-million-for-fired-
ceos-outlive-outrage.html [http://perma.cc/G82S-RQBX]. 
63 See Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the 
Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (1983) (describing a contemporary debate over excessive 
executive compensation); Bress, supra note 55, at 955 (reporting an increased number of 
shareholder derivative suits challenging the validity of chutes). For more recent 
controversies, see HODGSON & RUEL, supra note 62, at 2. 
64 I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (2012). 
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base salary.65 Concerns over pay also arose during the 2008 financial crisis, 
resulting in the Dodd–Frank Act’s requirement that public companies hold a 
non-binding shareholder vote at least every three years on what they pay their 
most senior executives (“Say-on-Pay”).66 The Act also requires disclosure of, 
and a non-binding shareholder vote on, golden parachute payments in any 
acquisition requiring a proxy or consent solicitation (“Say-on-Golden-
Parachute”).67 
A change in control typically is triggered when a third party acquires a pre-
determined percentage of a company’s voting stock or effects a change in the 
board.68 Companies have some latitude in defining when a change occurs; thus, 
a small company may require the acquisition of a majority of shares, whereas a 
larger company with dispersed ownership may require a lower percentage.69 
Some use a “single-trigger,” requiring only a change in control for a payment 
to be made, but those firms are in the minority since a change in control alone 
will not necessarily cause a beneficiary to lose her job.70 Instead, most chutes 
 
65 I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(a) (2012) (defining “excess parachute payment”). An employee’s 
base salary is her average annualized gross income during the five-year period before the 
date on which a change in ownership or control occurs. I.R.C. § 280G(d) (2012). 
66 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012). 
67 Id. 
68 See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 5 at 179; Road Map, supra note 56, at 350; 
Kenneth C. Johnsen, Note, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a 
Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 911-15 (1985) (providing background on 
chutes and the events that trigger them, and arguing that courts should examine the amount 
of compensation and whether a chute is structured as a risk-shifting device). 
69 See Becker & Gallardo, supra note 56. Chutes may require the acquisition of at least 
20%-25% of a company’s stock to be regarded as a change in control. See Johnsen, supra 
note 68, at 925; see also Road Map, supra note 56, at 350 (stating 25% is a common 
threshold for a change in control). A sample definition of change in control is set out in 
Pfizer Inc.’s 2014 Proxy Statement:  
“Change in Control” shall mean the consummation of any of the following events: (i) 
. . . at least a majority of the Board shall cease to consist of “Continuing Directors” 
. . . ; or (ii) any “person” or “group” (as determined for purposes of Section 13(d)(3) of 
the [Securities] Exchange Act [of 1934], except any majority-owned subsidiary of the 
Company or any employee benefit plan of the Company or any trust thereunder), shall 
have acquired “beneficial ownership” (as determined for purposes of Securities and 
Exchange Commission . . . Regulation 13d-3) of Shares having 30% or more of the 
voting power of all outstanding Shares, unless such acquisition is approved by a 
majority of the directors of the Company in office immediately preceding such 
acquisition; or (iii) a merger or consolidation occurs to which the Company is a party . . 
. ; or (iv) the sale of all, or substantially all, of the Company’s assets occurs; or (v) the 
stockholders of the Company approve a plan of complete liquidation of the Company. 
Pfizer Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at v (Mar. 13, 2014). 
70 Single-triggers, consequently, tend to be disfavored by institutional shareholders and 
proxy advisors (like Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis). See A 
Review of Golden Parachutes, GLASS LEWIS WORLD GOVERNANCE FOCUS (Glass Lewis & 
Co., S.F, Cal.), Oct. 2011, at 5, http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2012/04/ 
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today use a “double-trigger,”71 requiring a change in control plus involuntary 
termination of the beneficiary within a specified period afterwards.72 
Termination usually is involuntary if the company fires the executive “without 
cause”73 or the executive resigns for “good reason.”74 
 
GLWGFV3I4.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y5HV-RMJA] (stating that Glass Lewis recommended 
against approving single-trigger golden parachutes); Alert Letter, Frederic W. Cooke & Co., 
ISS Releases 2013 Policy Updates (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/11-19-12_%20ISS_Releases_2013_Policy 
_Updates.pdf [http://perma.cc/A9VR-KCC8] (stating ISS opposes single-triggers);  see also 
infra notes 214-221 and accompanying text (arguing that the termination-insurance purpose 
of chutes is only advanced by a double-trigger mechanism). Note, however, that a single-
trigger is common in equity plans (although it is becoming less so). See infra note 221 and 
accompanying text; see also ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 9 (showing that 9% of the 
companies have at least one chute agreement with a single-trigger, usually relating to the 
acceleration of equity awards or a guaranteed annual bonus, and 85% use single-triggers in 
their equity plans); FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., EVOLUTION OF CHANGE-IN-CONTROL 
PRACTICES: 2007 VS. 2010, at 8 (2010), http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/08-20-
10_Evolution_of_CIC_Practices_2007 
_vs_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JF5-KUKB] [hereinafter FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., 
EVOLUTION] (stating that, in 2010, 43% of the largest 100 companies in the S&P 500 Index 
adopted single-triggers involving acceleration of equity vesting, down from 57% in 2007). 
TrustCo Bank Corp. NY provides one example of a single-trigger used in an equity 
incentive plan: 
[Under the company’s 2010 Equity Incentive Plan,] all options, restricted stock, 
restricted stock units and performance share will become full[y] vested upon a change 
in control and the performance shares will be paid out based on the achievement of 
performance goals up to the date of the [change] in control. 
TrustCo Bank Corp. NY, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 45 (Apr. 1, 2014). 
71 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 9 (showing that, in 2013, ninety-six percent of 
companies with agreements and/or policies had at least one agreement or policy containing 
a double-trigger). 
72 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 9; FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., EVOLUTION, supra note 
70, at 7-8. The protected period averages two years, but ranges from one to three years. See 
ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 9. In addition, three percent of companies surveyed implemented 
a modified single-trigger, requiring a change in control plus the executive’s voluntary 
resignation within a specified period afterwards. See id. (describing the “window periods” in 
some plans wherein executives may voluntarily resign within a specified period after the 
change in control and still receive the benefits provided under the agreement or policy); 
FREDERIC W. COOK & CO, EVOLUTION, supra note 70, at 7-8. 
73 Different definitions of “cause” center on the beneficiary’s fraudulent or illegal acts or 
material harm to the business. For example, TrustCo Bank defines “cause” as “the 
executive’s commission of an act of fraud, embezzlement, or theft constituting a felony 
against [the company] as finally determined by a court of competent [jurisdiction] or an 
unequivocal admission by the executive.” TrustCo Bank Corp. NY, supra note 70, at 44. In 
comparison, Honeywell International defines “cause” to include “(c)(i) the willful failure to 
perform, (ii) gross negligence in the performance of, or (iii) intentional misconduct in the 
performance of, significant duties that results in material harm to the business of the 
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Once a chute is triggered, the beneficiary is entitled to one or more types of 
payments, including cash, the accelerated vesting of equity awards (stock and 
stock options), the continuation of fringe benefits, and “gross-up” tax 
payments.75 Cash payments usually are two to three times (2x-3x)76 the bene-
ficiary’s base salary and annual bonus, and often are paid in a lump sum.77 The 
vesting of equity awards is often the most valuable portion of a chute, 
averaging around seventy percent of total value in 2013.78 More than one-half 
of CEOs also continue to receive health and welfare benefits, often up to three 
 
Company.” Honeywell Int’l Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 70 (Mar. 
13, 2014). 
74 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 9; Becker & Gallardo, supra note 56. One example of 
“good reason” appears in the United Technologies Corp. proxy statement as follows: 
“Good Reason” shall mean a resignation of employment by the Participant following: 
(i) a material reduction in the Participant’s annual base salary, annual bonus 
opportunities, long-term incentive opportunities or other compensation and benefits in 
the aggregate from those in effect immediately prior to the Change-in-Control; (ii) a 
material diminution in the Participant’s title, duties, authority, responsibilities, 
functions or reporting relationship from those in effect immediately prior to the 
Change-in-Control; or (iii) a mandatory relocation of the Participant’s principal 
location of employment greater than 50 miles from immediately prior to the Change-in-
Control. 
United Techs. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 85 (Mar. 14, 2014). See 
also Fiss et al., supra note 5, at 1079 (stating that substantive changes in an executive’s 
duties include a significant reduction in authority, forced transfer, and oppressive travel 
schedules); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain for?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
231, 261 (2006) (finding that, in 70%-80% of the change-in-control agreements surveyed, 
“good reason” includes duties inconsistent with a CEO’s position, relocation, and failure to 
compensate). Whether or not a beneficiary has “good reason” to leave a job may depend on 
the circumstances. For example, even if an executive keeps her original title as CEO and her 
original salary, the company’s change from an independent entity to a controlled subsidiary 
could still result in a sufficient diminution of her duties. See Becker & Gallardo, supra note 
56. 
75 See Fiss et al., supra note 5, at 1079-80. 
76 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 10 (stating that 43% of the CEOs surveyed have a two- 
to three-times multiple, while 42% have a multiple of three times or greater). 
77 See id. at 10 (reporting that 78% of CEOs surveyed are entitled to cash payments); 
Becker & Gallardo, supra note 56 (exploring the commonly seen elements of chute 
payments). 
78 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 5-6 (reporting that long-term incentives, such as stock 
options, represent 67.1% of all chute payments for CEOs and 62.0% for other named 
executives); see also HODGSON & RUEL, supra note 62, at 3 (stating that equity profits have 
accounted for about 40% of final payments in the twenty-one CEO exit packages in excess 
of $100 million since 2000); Hartzell, supra note 59, at 44-45, 59 (showing that, from a 
sample of several hundred completed acquisitions in the late 1990s, the biggest increase in 
wealth comes from appreciation of the CEOs’ direct stockholdings and options). 
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years afterwards or until the start of a new job with similar benefits.79 Less 
common are enhanced retirement benefits,80 use of the corporate jet,81 and the 
payment of legal fees,82 outplacement service fees,83 and country club dues.84 
Finally, even though the practice is declining, a substantial number of firms 
provide beneficiaries with a gross-up amount85 equal to any excise taxes due 
on the chute payments they receive.86 
B. Innovation, Protection, and Chutes 
Innovation typically enhances firm value.87 A new product or a new 
approach to how a firm operates can create new business opportunities, 
 
79 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 13 (showing that 69% of CEOs surveyed receive an 
extension of health and welfare benefits). 
80 See id. at 14 (stating that 46% of the companies surveyed provide at least one 
executive with an enhancement in retirement benefits in the form, for example, of an 
increase in a retirement account, additional age and years of service credit, and accelerated 
vesting of a retirement benefit). 
81 See Fiss et al., supra note 5, at 1079. 
82 See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 14 (52%). 
83 See id. (36%).  
84 See id. at 5. 
85 See id. at 3 (finding that 30% of top executives are entitled to receive a gross-up 
payment, down from around 49% in 2011, and stating that 60% of companies currently 
providing gross-up payments intend to phase them out). Proxy advisors consider gross-up 
payments to be excessive, resulting in a decline in the number of companies providing it. 
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, M&A EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ENHANCEMENTS AND 
IMPACT ON THE SAY-ON-GOLDEN-PARACHUTE VOTE 1 (2013), https://www.sullcrom.com/ 
siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_M_A_Executive_Compensation_Enhancements_and
_Impact_on_the_Say_on_Golden_Parachute_Vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9UW-RFSQ] 
(reporting that ISS recommended a negative vote in three out of four deals surveyed that 
included granting new excise tax gross-ups); Kristin Gribben, Proxy Advisers: 
Intermediaries Spark Change in Pay Practices, FIN. TIMES (June 17, 2009, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5e5f9a20-5a11-11de-b687-00144feabdc0.html#axzz 
34CTiASHp [http://perma.cc/82VU-GTSL] (reporting that proxy advisory firm Risk 
Metrics listed a tax gross-up as a poor pay practice). Courts have also questioned the use of 
gross-ups. See Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Cont’l, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 9813, 1988 WL 46064, 
at *7 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (finding a gross-up to be “particularly troublesome,” but 
declining to preliminarily enjoin it since the board “seem[ed] to have shown that the plans 
were adopted in . . . good faith”). But see In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 
A.2d 691, 709 n.33 (Del. Ch. 2001) (observing that a gross-up is “hardly uncommon”). 
More than one-half of the largest 200 companies have indicated they intend to phase-out this 
benefit in the future. See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 3. 
86 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
87 See Atreya Chakraborty et al., Antitakeover Provisions, Managerial Entrenchment, 
and Firm Innovation, 72 J. ECON. & BUS. 30, 30 (2014) (“Firm innovation plays a critical 
role in creating, sustaining and adding firm value.”). 
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increase market share, and enhance firm value.88 For innovation to succeed, 
however, a firm’s managers must commit up front to making specific invest-
ments of physical assets and human capital.89 Those investments involve “sunk 
costs,” meaning that once they are incurred, they cannot be transferred to other 
firms or businesses or their transfer is limited.90 Whether or not to make those 
investments is determined by the firm’s managers, who have superior access to 
information about the firm and its affairs and, consequently, are in the best 
position to decide what is likely to maximize value.91 
Managers, however, have their own stake in whether or not to invest. They 
are likely to benefit from any realized value through promotion, higher salary, 
bonus, or all of the above.92 Yet, whether and when an investment creates 
value is uncertain,93 often involving a lag between when it is made and when 
its value is realized.94 This can be a problem for managers because share-
holders do not have the same private information that managers have about a 
firm’s specific investments.95 Rather, shareholders tend to rely on outcomes—
 
88 See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, CREATING A LEARNING SOCIETY: A NEW APPROACH TO GROWTH, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 14-15 (2014). 
89 Examples of specific investments appear supra at note 21 and accompanying text. The 
standard reference on specific investment is to studies by Oliver Williamson. See, e.g., 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 21, at 55, 115 (analyzing the impact of asset specificity on 
contractual relations in business). 
90 See id. at 55 (defining sunk costs as the opportunity costs of an investment whose 
value “is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original 
transaction be prematurely terminated”). 
91 See TIROLE, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining that insiders, such as managers, have private 
information about a firm’s technology and environment and its realized income); Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 46, at 660 (“[T]he managers are the ones who have the day-to-day 
knowledge of the company, its history, policies, opportunities, vulnerabilities, and 
challenges.”). 
92 Within a principal-agent setting, the agent (a manager) responds to explicit incentives 
(such as changes in compensation) and implicit incentives (such as career concerns) set by 
the principal (the shareholders). See Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Incentive 
Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence, 100 J. POL. ECON. 
468, 469 (1992) (arguing that firms should consider both explicit and implicit incentives 
when setting executive compensation); see also PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS 
DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 470 (2005). 
93 See Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 305, 
309 (1989) (observing that investments in innovation are riskier due to a higher probability 
of failure). 
94 See Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan, Executive Incentives and the Horizon 
Problem: An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. ACCT. & ECON. 51, 51-54 (1991) (analyzing the 
horizon issues caused by the fact that investments in research and development are often 
characterized by long gestation periods that extend beyond the tenure of managers). 
95 See TIROLE, supra note 9, at 2 (arguing that information asymmetry plagues the 
agency relationship between managers and investors); Holmstrom, supra note 33, at 74 
(offering a model of moral hazard within a principal-agent relationship where the agent has 
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changes in a firm’s stock price—in order to evaluate the managers’ 
performance.96 The underlying assumption is that changes in stock price reflect 
information about investment decisions. Shareholders can rely on stock prices 
as an indication of fundamental value, narrowing the informational divide 
between shareholders and managers.97 If accurate, the concerns arising from 
uncertainty over future outcomes are reduced, because long-term value is 
reflected in current market prices. 
That assumption, however, weakens to the extent a firm invests in 
innovative technology—new products or services that are not already offered 
in the market, principally for two reasons. First, information about the long-
term value of innovation tends to be “soft”—not verifiable and hence less 
likely to be accurately reflected in stock prices.98 And, second, by investing in 
innovation, a firm’s managers tend to increase upfront costs and decrease the 
firm’s near-term profits, lowering the firm’s current stock price.99 Shareholders 
may take the short-term drop in profits (and the fall in stock price) to be a sign 
of mismanagement when, instead, it reflects the costs of an investment whose 
value will not be realized until later.100 
 
private information); Edmans et al., supra note 29, at 2 (explaining that “soft” (non-
verifiable) information regarding a firm’s intangible assets is difficult to incorporate into 
price through standard channels such as disclosure). This is especially true in the case of 
innovation. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm 
Value? Antitakeover Protections in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 102 (2001) (explaining 
that asymmetric information is more intense for investments in innovation, such as research 
and development (“R&D”) investments); Mark S. Johnson & Ramesh P. Rao, The Impact of 
Antitakeover Amendments on Corporate Financial Performance, 32 FIN. REV. 659, 664-65, 
678 (1997) (using R&D as a proxy for investments characterized by a high level of 
asymmetric information about the investment’s value); William Pugh et al., Antitakeover 
Charter Amendments: Effects on Corporate Decisions, 15 J. FIN. RES. 57, 57-58 (1992) 
(same). 
96 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
97 See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 34, at 62 (“[S]tockholders cannot observe all 
the inner workings of the firm and must rely on some imperfect summary statistic such as 
reported earnings.”). 
98 “Soft information” is information that cannot be easily verified by investors even when 
it is disclosed. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 9, at 249-50. As a result, soft information is 
more difficult to incorporate into stock prices. See Edmans et al., supra note 29, at 2. 
99 See Edmans et al., supra note 29, at 2-3 (suggesting that the difficulty of accounting 
for soft information leads to a difference between financial and real efficiency so that 
managers who want to show improvement are likely to cut intangible investments in order 
to increase current earnings). 
100 See, e.g., Louis K.C. Chan et al., The Stock Market Valuation of Research and 
Development Expenditures, 56 J. FIN. 2431, 2431 (2001) (showing empirically that the long-
term benefits of R&D tend to be underestimated in the short-term); Allan C. Eberhart et al., 
An Examination of Long-Term Abnormal Stock Returns and Operating Performance 
Following R&D Increases, 59 J. FIN. 623, 623 (2004) (showing that R&D increases are 
beneficial, but that the market is slow to recognize the extent of the benefit); Stein, Takeover 
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That problem intensifies when firms compete to attract capital. Shareholders 
who make investment decisions based on relative performance are more likely 
to prefer firms with high short-term results over firms that opt to invest in 
longer-term projects.101 The result is that dispersed shareholders, attempting to 
maximize the value of their holdings, cannot credibly commit not to remove 
the board or sell the company upon a drop in performance—some shareholders 
may sell their shares, potentially to an acquirer, and others may vote out the 
existing board.102 The greater risk of a change in control, in turn, increases the 
risk to managers of losing the benefit of their sunk costs—in effect, exposing 
them to the risk of later expropriation of their specific investment in the 
firm.103 Managers, in response, are more likely to reduce how much they are 
willing to specifically invest. 
The remedy is to create a means to protect managers from the risk of later 
expropriation of their specific investments. One approach is to rely on the 
board—insulating directors from shareholder pressure so they can credibly 
commit to a long-term investment strategy.104 Directors are better than public 
shareholders at assessing managerial performance. Their special access to 
firm-specific information (including soft information) permits them to better 
identify whether short-term underperformance is the result of mismanagement 
or the pursuit of specific investments that require upfront expenditures.105 
 
Threats, supra note 34, at 63-67 (showing formally that asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders may lead the latter to undervalue corporate assets). 
101 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 46, at 700-03 (providing an example where long-
term investment projects are likely to result in undervaluation of the company and 
demonstrating how this can affect a manager’s investment strategy). 
102 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 29, at 8-9, 52-53 (describing the commitment 
problem affecting public shareholders in a competitive environment); see also Finn E. 
Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal 
Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 473-74 (1977) (describing incentive problems that arise when a 
particular course of action is ex ante but not ex post profitable to an agent). 
103 As Oliver Williamson has observed, managers who develop firm-specific 
relationships need “more protection” than managers who can redeploy their knowledge and 
expertise to other firms. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 
1216 (1984). 
104 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 29, at 3 (showing that the adoption of a staggered 
board is associated to long-term increases in firm value); William C. Johnson et al., The 
Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 
307, 307 (2015) (showing that antitakeover defenses, such as a staggered board, may provide 
a valuable commitment from shareholders to other stakeholders in the context of specific 
relationships); Richard H. Koppes et al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate 
over Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1051-53 (1999) (arguing that adoption of a 
staggered board benefits corporations through “increased stability and improved long-term 
planning”). 
105 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 46, at 659-60 (“As between directors and 
shareholders, it is the directors who have the best access to information and are best able to 
serve as the monitors of the managers, increasing the likelihood of compliance with 
  
2015] RETHINKING CHUTES 2047 
 
Directors also face a reputational sanction if they default on a commitment,106 
a less likely threat for dispersed shareholders whose decisions tend to be ano-
nymous. The board, however, is still subject to shareholder oversight—and 
shareholders can terminate directors they view to be performing poorly based 
on a short-term drop in profits that, as noted before, fails to reflect the value of 
a specific investment.107 Measures to insulate the board from shareholder and 
market pressure (like a staggered board or a poison pill) can mitigate that risk 
and permit the board to more credibly commit to longer-term strategies. 
Controlling shareholders can also protect managers from expropriation.108 
Controlling shareholders monitor management performance more closely than 
dispersed shareholders, since the cost of selling a large block of stock is 
greater.109 They also tend to have better access to information,110 partly 
because they often hold board seats (directly or through a representative),111 
which enable them to better assess management performance. Moreover, 
unlike dispersed shareholders, controlling shareholders are more likely to be 
subject to reputational sanction if they default on a prior commitment, 
 
continuing and emerging regulations.”); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 330, 332 (1983) (explaining that 
shareholders specialize in risk-bearing, managers specialize in making business decisions, 
and directors specialize in monitoring the effectiveness of those decisions); Eugene F. Fama 
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 307-09 
(1983) (arguing that a specialized organizational model efficiently controls agency costs). 
106 See Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate 
Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 58, 94-96 (2010) 
(offering a survey of the literature on boards’ reputational issues). 
107 See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. 
108 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 46, at 714 (arguing that controlling shareholders 
tend to favor a long-term investment horizon because they often cannot or do not want to 
sell their shares); see also infra note 138 and accompanying text (arguing that dual-class 
stock, which can act as a proxy for a controlling shareholder, can also provide sufficient 
insulation for managers). 
109 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785 (2003) (arguing that the presence of a controlling 
shareholder involves a tradeoff between reduction of the classic agency problem between 
shareholders and managers and extraction of private benefits by the controller); Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 
461, 461-62 (1986) (arguing that large shareholders are likely to seek to improve the firm, 
even at their own expense, in part through close monitoring). 
110 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 571 (2003). 
111 See Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders 
in Publicly Held Corporations, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 317, 324 (1988) (reporting that large-block 
shareholders or their representatives almost always serve as directors or officers); see also 
Clifford G. Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, FRBNY ECON. 
POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 51 (offering a survey of the empirical literature on blockholders 
and corporate control). 
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especially if they serve as a firm’s directors.112 The combination—higher exit 
costs, greater access to information, and reputational risk—makes a controlling 
shareholder’s commitment to a firm’s long-term investment strategy more 
credible.113 
Our focus is on using a manager’s compensation contract to mitigate the risk 
of expropriation. Classic agency cost theory tells us that tying management 
compensation to performance—pay-for-performance that rewards managers for 
good outcomes and punishes them for bad—will induce them to exert effort and 
improve productivity.114 The standard approach, however, may have adverse 
consequences if the goal is to induce managers to explore new, untested invest-
ments rather than exploit existing ones.115 Pay-for-performance typically 
rewards (or penalizes) managers based on near-term outcomes and, 
consequently, is more likely to encourage managers to cause the firm’s present 
expected output to rise, potentially at the expense of future returns.116 This is 
particularly true if a drop in near-term performance is more likely to lead to a 
change in control—perhaps an acquisition—when neither the shareholders nor 
the board can credibly commit to a long-term investment strategy.117 Con-
sequently, compensation contracts that are designed to motivate innovation and 
other specific investments should be structured differently from standard pay-
for-performance arrangements. 
Chutes address this concern by protecting managers in the event of a change 
in control that is prompted by lower near-term performance that resulted from 
investments in innovation or other firm-specific projects. In this sense, chutes 
serve as a kind of insurance against a prospective change in the firm’s invest-
 
112 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
113 We note that Dino Falaschetti, in Golden Parachutes: Credible Commitments or 
Evidence of Shirking?, 8 J. CORP. FIN. 159, 160-61 (2002), divided non-controlling 
shareholders into two categories: dispersed and more concentrated shareholders. He 
suggested that commitment problems are more severe in firms with more concentrated 
shareholders, since blockholders can more credibly threaten to interfere with incumbent 
managers. Id. at 160. Nevertheless, the ability of dispersed shareholders to quickly exit a 
firm is likely to raise equally severe commitment problems. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 
29, at 7-8, 52-53. Moreover, although Falaschetti empirically documented an increase in the 
level of chutes when ownership is more concentrated, those results have been challenged by 
subsequent empirical research. See Small et al., supra note 9, at 381 (finding little evidence 
that external ownership significantly increases the incidence of chutes). 
114 See Holmstrom, supra note 33, at 75-80. 
115 See Gustavo Manso, Motivating Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 1823, 1823-24 (2011). 
116 See John Y. Zhu, Myopic Agency 1-3 (Aug. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/bepp/assets/File/AE-SU12-Zhu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DM8M-6TLG]. 
117 In a friendly deal, if the board agrees to sell the firm, consistent with its fiduciary 
duties, it will potentially cause managers to lose the value of their investments. In a hostile 
deal, the board may not be able to block a change in control, and public shareholders may 
choose to sell their shares to the acquirer. 
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ment strategy,118 and a chute’s payments—similar to specified (or liquidated) 
damages—reflect the loss to managers of the value resulting from their sunk 
costs.119 They ensure talented managers they will retain the benefits of their 
investment, even upon a change in control.120 
Policymakers and the press typically focus only on the payments that must 
be made when a chute is triggered.121 That focus misses the mark. First, it fails 
to account for the chute’s expected cost at the time it is granted. The expected 
cost is a small fraction of what is actually paid (if the chute is triggered at all), 
reflecting the likelihood that nothing will ever be paid, as well as the board’s 
ability to terminate managers who underperform.122 Second, the chute’s 
expected cost is offset by the value of the specific investments a manager is 
more likely to make as a result of having a chute. Any assessment of cost, 
therefore, must also account for the drop in firm value that would likely result 
from the chute’s absence. 
In the next Section, we present a numerical example to illustrate the 
intuition behind our theory of chutes. Our purpose in presenting this example is 
three-fold. First, we demonstrate that the standard approach to pay-for-
performance may adversely affect a manager’s incentives to invest in 
innovation. Second, we show how chutes can help offset the disincentive to 
innovate and thereby promote the creation of longer-term firm value. And, 
 
118 See CLARK, supra note 41, at 577 (suggesting that golden parachutes benefit 
shareholders by reducing managers’ incentives to stop takeovers by making costly defensive 
acquisitions and allowing a successful takeover of the firm along with substantial 
compensation to departing managers). 
119 See Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 377 N.W.2d 593, 604 n.12 (Wis. 1985) 
(describing chutes as a “stipulated damages mechanism”). On the economics of liquidated 
damages, see generally Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in 
Contractual Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582 (1992) 
(reconciling the economic efficiency of liquidated damages clauses with the law’s 
unwillingness to allow them in contracts). Consistent with the economics of liquidated 
damages, a chute’s payment should not make the outside option (cashing the chute) more 
rewarding to a manager than future employment (performance). See Simone M. Sepe, 
Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 231-32 (2011). 
Otherwise, the mechanism will raise the risk of moral hazard rather than create incentives to 
make specific investments. See id. 
120 This is, in fact, a stated reason why firms adopt chutes. See, e.g., CenturyLink, Inc., 
supra note 10, at 60 (“[P]rior to a takeover, [chute] protections help [the board] to recruit 
and retain talented officers.”); Omnicare, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), 
at 35 (Apr. 18, 2014) (stating that the goal of the change-in-control plan is to retain qualified 
senior officers); The Travelers Cos., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 46 (Apr. 
11, 2014) (“The Compensation Committee believes that severance and, in certain 
circumstances, change in control arrangements are necessary to attract and retain the talent 
necessary for our long-term success.”). 
121 Examples of the focus on payouts when a chute is triggered appear supra at notes 63-
67 and accompanying text, and infra at notes 223-26, 234-39 and accompanying text.  
122 See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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third, we illustrate how antitakeover devices (such as staggered boards and 
poison pills) and pay-for-performance plans can be regarded as partial 
substitutes for one another, reducing a chute’s expected cost. 
C. The Value of Pay-Without-Performance: A Numerical Example 
In this Section, we set out a numerical example of our theory of chutes that 
involves a company that has hired a manager to run a business. For illustration, 
we assume the business lasts only two periods, with the first period 
representing the short-term and the second period representing the long-term. 
The manager can choose between two different projects, with the quality of 
each project—how successful it is likely to be and the potential value to the 
firm—being observable only by the manager. The first project—the “Regular 
Project”—involves simple, non-firm-specific investments, such as those 
needed to manufacture physical products that are similar to products already 
offered by other firms. There are no sunk costs, and the Regular Project 
delivers income of 100 in each period. The second project—the “Innovative 
Project”—involves specific investments to develop a new product, including 
investments in R&D and intense human capital investments by managers. 
Compared to the Regular Project, there is a greater risk of failure in pursuing a 
non-standard investment opportunity. Consequently, in the short-term, the 
Innovative Project delivers income of 100 with a probability of 50%, and 0 
with a probability of 50%. In the long-term, however, the Innovative Project 
will deliver income of 200.123 The manager’s sunk cost to pursue the 
Innovative Project is 5. 
Based on our assumptions, the Innovative Project is more socially desirable 
than the Regular Project because it will deliver a higher expected value across 
the two periods. The total expected income from the Innovative Project, net of 
the manager’s sunk cost, equals (0.5  100) + 200 – 5 = 245. The total income 
from the Regular Project equals 100 + 100 = 200. Accordingly, if a manager 
chooses the Regular Project over the Innovative Project, society bears a 
welfare loss equal to 45 (that is, 245 – 200). 
The question this Article poses is whether a compensation structure can be 
developed that provides managers with an incentive to pursue the Innovative 
Project. For convenience, in this first illustration, we assume that the question 
of shareholder commitment (whether shareholders will remove the manager or 
 
123 Under standard moral hazard assumptions, the principal (the shareholders) (i) does 
not observe project selection by the agent (the manager), and (ii) cannot perfectly infer what 
project the manager undertook even after realization of the final payoff. See TIROLE, supra 
note 9, at 2, 15-17 (“[O]utsiders cannot observe insiders’ carefulness in selecting projects, 
the riskiness of investments, or the effort they exert to make the firm profitable (moral 
hazard).”). Accordingly, the Regular Project’s payoff in the second period is more 
accurately described as equal to 0.5 200 = 100, consistent with the assumption that the 
shareholders ex post remain unable to tell whether the manager undertook the Regular 
Project or the Innovative Project. 
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sell shares to an acquirer if near-term performance drops) is addressed by 
shielding the manager from removal until her long-term payout is realized. For 
example, there may be a staggered board and poison pill that mitigate the 
negative effects of the shareholders’ inability to commit to a long-term 
investment plan.124 Managers, however, may still be unwilling to exert the 
costly effort needed to pursue the Innovative Project. A standard pay-for-
performance arrangement can address this concern so long as the percentage of 
income the manager is entitled to receive, α, makes it efficient for her to 
choose the Innovative Project over the Regular Project (referred to as her 
“incentive compatibility constraint”).125 In our numerical example, for α ≥ 0.1 
(10%), the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint is always satisfied; 0.1 
 [(0.5  100) + 200] – 5 ≥ 0.1  (100 + 100) holds, where the left-hand side 
of the equation represents the manager’s payout from pursuing the Innovative 
Project, and the right-hand side represents her payout from pursuing the 
Regular Project. 
Now suppose the manager is not shielded from removal. In that case, the 
manager faces the risk that shareholders will remove her in the event of a low 
near-term performance—either directly or as a consequence of a change in 
control. This risk is greater in the case of the Innovative Project, which has a 
fifty percent probability of delivering zero income in the short-term, compared 
to the Regular Project, which has no risk of early failure.126 Under the circum-
stances, the standard pay-for-performance arrangement no longer favors the 
Innovative Project, because the manager may be terminated before realizing 
value in the long-term, causing her expected share of the long-term value to be 
expropriated. If we assume a 50% probability of the Innovative Project 
yielding zero income in the short-term, and a further 50% probability of the 
manager being removed in such event, the manager can expect only a 75% 
 
124 See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing various antitakeover 
devices meant to insulate management from market pressure). 
125 The incentive compatibility constraint is a condition of optimal contracts that is 
satisfied when the contract induces an agent to choose actions that maximize the utilities of 
both the principal and the agent. See BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT 122 
(2d ed. 2005). 
126 For convenience, we assume here that the shareholders are unable to accurately 
evaluate why there is a low short-term outcome and, therefore, may misinterpret it as 
signaling managerial underperformance. In fact, within the numerical example, the 
realization of a zero payoff in the short-term would lead the shareholders to infer that the 
manager had selected the Innovative Project. As a result, the corporation’s share price 
would reflect this information and the likelihood of managerial removal would decline. 
Therefore, in order to sustain the assumption that shareholders may misinterpret why a zero 
payoff occurred, we must further assume that in the market there are “bad” managers with 
projects of poor quality who also produce a zero payoff in the short-term. Under this 
assumption, shareholders face an adverse selection problem and do not know whether a zero 
payoff in the short-term signals a good manager who selected the Innovative Project or a 
bad manager who selected a poor-quality project. 
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probability of remaining in office when the long-term payout materializes.127 
Under the circumstances, her expected gains from pursuing the Innovative 
Project drop to 0.1  [(0.5  100) + (0.75  200)] – 5 = 15, which is less than 
the 20 she would receive under the Regular Project. 
It is worth emphasizing that, so long as there is a significant risk of the 
manager’s removal before a long-term payout materializes, increasing the 
percentage of income the manager receives (α) will not alter her interest in 
pursuing the Regular Project. In our example, where the manager faces a 25% 
risk of removal, even granting her 100% of the income (α = 1) does not satisfy 
the incentive compatibility constraint, because the manager’s payout from 
pursuing the Innovative Project is still less than her payout from pursuing the 
Regular Project: 1  [(0.5  100) + (0.75  200)] – 5 < 1  (100 + 100). 
These results illustrate the need for incentives that differ from the standard 
pay-for-performance arrangement to motivate managers to invest in innovation 
and other firm-specific projects. A golden parachute serves this goal by 
providing managers with insurance against the adverse consequences of short-
term losses. In this sense, “pay-without-performance”—an incentive structure 
that encourages managers to develop innovative technologies, even if they 
result in lower performance in the short-term—may favor Innovative Projects 
that are socially valuable. 
To illustrate, we modify our numerical example to reflect the economic 
benefits of chutes. We assume that a chute’s payment is triggered upon a 
change in control in the short-term, which occurs with a 25% probability. For 
simplicity, we keep unchanged the share of income paid to the manager (α) at 
10%. The question is how large the chute payment (G) should be in order to 
induce the manager to pursue the Innovative Project over the Regular Project. 
In other words, how large must G be in order for the following condition to 
hold: 0.1  [(0.5  100) + (0.75  200)] + (0.25  G) – 5 ≥ 0.1  (100 + 
100). This condition is satisfied for any G equal to or greater than 20.128 
On its face, G ≥ 20 may appear to be a large amount. However, as discussed 
earlier,129 the chute’s expected cost is only a small fraction of the chute’s dollar 
amount, reflecting the likelihood that a change in control may not occur and 
the chute may never be paid. In our illustration, where there is a 25% chance of 
a change in control, the chute’s expected cost is only 5 (that is, 0.25  20), 
which is substantially less than its payout amount. Moreover, the expected cost 
is small compared to the expected gain for the shareholders. Although they 
expect to receive 0.9  (100 + 100) = 180 under the Regular Project, under the 
 
127 The manager will be terminated with a 50% probability if the Innovative Project 
yields a zero payoff, which also occurs with a 50% probability. Hence, the manager can 
expect to be terminated with a probability equal to 0.5  0.5 = 0.25 (25%) and, conversely, 
she can expect to keep her job with a 75% probability. 
128 The formula simplifies to 15 + (0.25  G) ≥ 20, with G ≥ 20. 
129 See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text. 
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Innovative Project they expect to receive 0.9  [(0.5  100) + (0.75  200)] + 
0.25  (200 – 20) = 225, with a net expected gain of 45.130 
The adoption of an antitakeover device or the presence of a controlling 
shareholder can further lower the expected cost of a chute by reducing the 
likelihood of a change in control and, in turn, reducing the probability of a 
chute payment being made. Staggered boards and poison pills minimize the 
risk of expropriation by limiting the likelihood of a change in control.131 
Chutes, by contrast, are unlikely to deter takeovers,132 but they assure 
managers they will benefit from the long-term value of their work, even if 
there is a later change in control. By increasing the likelihood of long-term 
employment, these devices can also increase the expected value of a manager’s 
long-term compensation. To that extent, by encouraging managers to pursue 
Innovative Projects, chutes and antitakeover devices can be regarded as partial 
substitutes for one another. 
A modification of our example illustrates this point. Suppose the company 
adopted a staggered board and a poison pill. In that case, we can expect a 
substantial drop in the likelihood of a change in control,133 which we will 
assume (for the sake of illustration) drops from 50% to 20%. As a result, the 
probability the manager will be terminated in the short-term drops from 25% 
(without an antitakeover device) to 10% (a 20% chance of a change in control 
 50% chance of termination)—meaning that the manager has a 90% 
probability of receiving her share of the company’s long-term income. 
Assuming that α remains 10%, the incentive compatible contract that induces 
the manager to choose the Innovative Project must satisfy the following 
condition: 0.1  [(0.5  100) + (0.9  200)] + (0.1  G) – 5 ≥ 0.1  (100 + 
100). In this case, the dollar amount of the chute remains the same (G ≥ 20), 
but the chute’s expected cost is remarkably lower. Rather than an expected cost 
of 5 (that is, 0.25  20), when there is a staggered board and poison pill, the 
expected cost reduces to 2 (that is, 0.1  20). 
A partial substitute effect also takes place between chutes, antitakeover 
devices, and the pay-for-performance component of a manager’s compensation 
package. Indeed, as long as the probability that the manager may be terminated 
 
130 To clarify: (i) 0.9 is the percentage of payoff to the shareholders; (ii) (0.5  100) is 
the expected payoff of the Innovative Project in the short-term; (iii) (0.75  200) is the 
expected payoff to the shareholders when the manager is not fired (the shareholders receive 
200 with a probability of 75%); and (iv) 0.25  (200 – 20) is the payoff the shareholders 
expect to receive when the manager is fired and receives a payment under a chute.  
131 See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (pointing out that because chutes, on 
average, comprise only 0.31% of a target’s market value, this cost is unlikely to deter a 
determined buyer from initiating a takeover). 
133 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890 (2002) (“[T]he managers of targets 
with staggered boards can—and most of the time do—maintain the target’s 
independence.”). 
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in the short-term is relatively low, increasing the manager’s pay-for-
performance component can reduce the chute’s dollar amount and its expected 
cost. To illustrate, assume again that the company has adopted a staggered 
board and poison pill, resulting in a 90% probability that the manager will 
enjoy her share of the company’s long-term income. Also assume that α 
increases from 10% to 15%, reflecting an increase in pay-for-performance. 
Under those circumstances, in order for the manager’s contract to be incentive 
compatible, the following must be satisfied: 0.15  [(0.5  100) + (0.9  
200)] + (0.1  G) – 5 ≥ 0.15  (100 + 100). Both the chute’s dollar amount 
and its expected cost are substantially reduced compared to when the manager 
receives lower pay-for-performance. In effect, the increase in what the 
company agrees to pay in the ordinary course—the higher pay-for-performance 
during both the short- and long-term—reduces the chute’s size. As a result, the 
incentive compatibility condition is satisfied for any golden parachute where G 
≥ 5, implying a chute’s expected cost to the company of 0.1  5 = 0.5.134 
Of course, increasing pay-for-performance increases the actual cost of 
compensating the manager. Chutes are different, since payment is contingent 
on a later change in control and loss of employment. Hence, there is a trade-off 
between paying the manager more and reducing a chute’s expected cost, which 
may need to be balanced on a case-by-case basis. 
II. CHUTES, TAKEOVER PROTECTIONS, AND FIRM VALUE: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
In Part I, we highlighted a gap in the corporate law scholarship—arguing 
that chutes are less relevant to a firm during a takeover than they are before a 
takeover. Unlike traditional pay-for-performance, chutes can encourage 
managers to specifically invest in a firm by assuring them they will not lose the 
long-term value of their work.135 Chutes do so by providing a payout if there is 
a later change in the firm’s investment policies—whether due to sale of the 
firm or forced turnover among its directors—in situations where neither share-
holders nor the board can credibly commit to a long-term strategy.136 
In this Part, we provide empirical support for our theoretical claims. Our 
approach is fundamentally different from the standard framing. That approach 
considers antitakeover devices, including chutes, staggered boards, and poison 
pills, to be principally designed to entrench managers by insulating them from 
 
134 Increasing the share of the manager’s payoff (for example, up to 1/6) reduces the 
amount of the golden parachute to zero: 1/6  [(0.5  100) + (0.9  200)] – 5 ≥ 1/6  (100 
+ 100) holds. 
135 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (arguing that chutes provide 
compensation for managers’ sunk costs). 
136 See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text (describing how directors and 
controlling shareholders can, to a degree, insulate managers from market pressures).  
  
2015] RETHINKING CHUTES 2055 
 
market pressure.137 Dual-class stock—which is used as a proxy for the 
presence of a controlling shareholder—is an exception, since existing studies 
acknowledge that concentrated ownership tends to insulate managers and 
render other protective features relatively unimportant.138 Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick introduced this approach when building a broad index (the “GIM-
Index”), based on twenty-four defensive features, which they found to be nega-
tively correlated with firm value.139 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell later 
criticized the GIM-Index, noting it was unlikely that all of the Index’s features 
contributed to the negative correlation.140 Their refined index (the “E-Index”) 
retained only six of the GIM-Index’s original features—including chutes, 
staggered boards, and poison pills—that they argued were more likely to 
evidence management entrenchment.141 
Both the GIM-Index and the E-Index assess antitakeover provisions 
cumulatively, with the level of insulation increasing in the number of 
protections a firm adopts.142 Although each provision insulates the board, they 
are also presumed to act as complements by increasing the level of insulation 
when adopted together. Unlike those studies, we consider chutes, staggered 
boards, and poison pills outside the takeover context. In that environment, we 
argue that they primarily act as partial substitutes, not complements—each 
promoting specific investment by limiting the managers’ risk of the value of 
those investments later being expropriated.143 In other words, chutes can 
complement a staggered board or a poison pill if the goal is to reduce the like-
lihood of takeover. If the goal, however, is to promote specific investment, 
 
137 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 46, at 783 (arguing that antitakeover provisions that 
weaken shareholder rights, including chutes, should not be considered in isolation, but 
rather as a “universe of provisions together”). But see Cremers et al., supra note 45, at 4-5 
(empirically challenging the assumption that board and managerial protection from removal 
is detrimental to shareholder interests).  
138 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 46, at 797 (explaining that the authors exclude firms 
with a dual-class structure from their analysis of protective features since “[i]n these 
companies the holding of superior voting rights might be sufficient to provide incumbents 
with a powerful entrenching mechanism that renders other entrenching provisions relatively 
unimportant”); Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class 
Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010) (defining dual-class stock 
as the most extreme example of antitakeover protection). 
139 See Gompers et al., supra note 46, at 109-10 (finding such a correlation); id. at 145-
50, app. 1 (defining the defensive features). 
140 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 46, at 784. 
141 See id. at 784-85 (restricting the twenty-four provisions included in the GIM-Index to 
the following: (i) staggered boards, (ii) limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, (iii) 
supermajority requirements for mergers, (iv) supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments, (v) poison pills, and (vi) golden parachutes). 
142 See id. at 785; Gompers et al., supra note 46, at 109. 
143 This means that, while a staggered board or a chute may have different values in 
preventing takeovers, they tend to have similar values when protecting specific investments.  
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those features also act as partial substitutes. To that extent, and in light of our 
empirical findings below that chutes are associated with increased value in 
innovative firms, the Indices’ approach to chutes and their presumed 
entrenchment effect may need to be reassessed.144 
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating the most recent use of 
chutes, staggered boards, and poison pills,145 finding evidence consistent with 
our view that chutes and antitakeover devices can be regarded as partial 
substitutes for one another in promoting specific managerial investment.146 
Next, we investigate how adopting a protective feature affects total CEO 
compensation, similarly finding support for our view that a firm’s managers 
will demand to be paid more upfront if they are not protected against the risk 
of later expropriation.147 After this, we show that chutes increase value in firms 
where inducing managers to undertake specific investment is likely to be more 
beneficial, such as firms that are innovative.148 
Our data come from several sources. The data for protective features—
golden parachutes (Parachute), controlling shareholders (evidenced by the use 
of dual-class stock (Dual))149, staggered boards (Staggered), and poison pills 
(Pill)—are from the Risk Metrics database, which covers the years 2007-
2012.150 We decided to restrict our analysis to the 2009-2012 interval 
principally for two reasons. First, we were concerned that including data from 
2007 and 2008, when the financial crisis was in full force, could bias our 
analysis in light of the crisis’s extraordinary effect on the general economy and 
stock prices.151 And, second, perhaps more importantly, recent analysis 
indicates a material risk that Risk Metrics may have underreported the level of 
Parachute starting in 2007,152 and in particular, in 2008.153 In light of those 
 
144 A similar concern with proxy advisor recommendations is discussed infra at notes 
221-230 and accompanying text. 
145 See infra Section II.A.  
146 See supra notes 134, 143-44 and accompanying text. 
147 See infra Section II.B. 
148 See infra Section II.C. 
149 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (defining dual-class stock and why it can 
be evidence of a controlling shareholder). 
150 Since 1990, the Investor Responsibility Research Center (“IRRC”) has published 
volumes every two to three years that provide detailed information on several governance 
provisions, including antitakeover protective devices, at about 1500 firms (with the number 
of firms increasing to up to 1900 to 2000 firms in more recent volumes). After being 
acquired by Risk Metrics in 2007, the IRRC publications have become annual. See Bebchuk 
et al., supra note 5, at 142 (explaining that their data was taken from consecutive IRRC 
reports published in 9/1990, 7/1993, 7/1995, 2/1998, 11/1999, 2/2002, 1/2004, and 1/2006). 
151 Jean Tirole, Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore 
Market Functioning, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 29, 29-33 (2012). See also infra note 165 and 
accompanying text (discussing adverse selection). 
152 A forthcoming study by Martijn Cremers, Allen Ferrel, Paul Gompers, and Andrew 
Metrick (the “CFGM study”) hand-checked the Risk Metrics data on golden parachutes for 
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risks of bias, we conservatively constrained our analysis to the period 
beginning in 2009. 
Each protective feature is computed as an indicator (or dummy) variable, 
with a value of one if the firm has that feature and zero if not. Data on 
executive compensation (CEO Total Compensation, as reported in public 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission)154 are from the Execu-
Comp database and cover the period 2009-2012.155 Data on the variables we 
employ in the regression analysis of chutes are from a dataset constructed by 
one of us for an earlier co-authored study and cover the period 2009-2011.156 
Those variables include: Firm Value, as measured by Tobin’s Q;157 Assets, 
 
the period beginning in 2007. E-mail from Martijn Cremers, Professor of Fin., Univ. Notre 
Dame – Mendoza Coll. of Bus., to Simone Sepe, Professor of Law & Fin., Univ. of Ariz. – 
James E. Rogers Coll. of Law (Sept. 30, 2015, 1:41 PM) (on file with authors). The CFGM 
study found that Risk Metrics appears to have underreported the levels of golden parachutes 
during such period, with a substantial under-reporting of the levels of golden parachutes for 
the year 2008. Id. 
153 More specifically, while Risk Metrics reported a level of Parachute around 34% for 
the year 2008, the CFGM research reports a level of about 81%. However, the levels of 
Parachute reported by Risk Metrics for 2009 are similar to those found by CFGM for 2008. 
Hence, we have reason to believe that starting in 2009 the possibility that Risk Metrics 
could have miscoded, and therefore, misreported data on Parachute is minimized. Id.  
154 Federal securities laws require publicly traded companies to disclose a number of 
specified items in their annual reports on Form 10-K, including executive compensation. See 
Executive Compensation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm [http://perma.cc/K7CK-KTUH]. 
155 The ExecuComp database provides information on executives at S&P 1000 firms, 
including information on salaries, bonuses, and stock options since 1992. Since the 
ExecuComp database only provides data on an annual basis, the data are pro-rated as in 
Viral Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, Taking Risk: Evidence From Non-Executive Pay in U.S. 
Bank Holding Companies 39 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 13-18, 2014), 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/13/13-18.pdf [http://perma.cc/9Q96-EEFR] (“[W]e 
pro-rate the annual aggregate cash compensation and the annual aggregate stock 
compensation to the top executives team in the same proportions as total cash and stock 
compensation.”). 
156 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 29, at 30-31. 
157 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value (defined as the firm’s total liabilities, 
minus its deferred taxes and investment tax credits, plus the value of its preferred stock and 
the market value of its common stock) divided by the replacement cost of its assets. See 
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions 
About Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 7-8 (2002). The measure was introduced 
by James Tobin in A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969) (“According to this approach, the principal way in which 
financial policies and events affect aggregate demand is by changing the valuations of 
physical assets relative to their replacement costs.”). Tobin’s Q has become a commonly 
recognized proxy for market valuation. See, e.g., Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, 
Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 40, 47 (1995); Larry H. P. Lang 
& René Stulz, Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. 
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which measures a firm’s assets at book value; Leverage, which measures a 
firm’s borrowings and other leverage at book value; Capital Expenditures, 
which measures a firm’s expenses used to acquire or upgrade assets as a 
proportion of total assets; and R&D, which sets out a firm’s research and 
development expenses (as a measure of the firm’s innovation) in proportion to 
total sales.158 Although data availability varies depending on the source, 
overall our dataset covers about 1600 firms. 
A. Chutes and Corporate Governance 
Within our theoretical framework, we identified two protective features, in 
addition to chutes, that promote specific investment by managers: the presence 
of a controlling shareholder and the adoption of an antitakeover protection like 
a staggered board or a poison pill.159 Our argument is that each feature acts as a 
partial substitute for the others in promoting specific investment. 
We begin by documenting the levels of each feature from 2009 to 2012 in 
Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
ECON. 1248, 1249-50 (1994) (studying whether the market valuation of a firm correlated 
with its degree of diversification by focusing on Tobin’s Q, which they defined as the 
“present value of future cash flows divided by the replacement cost of tangible assets”); 
Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of 
Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 186 (1996). One major 
advantage of Tobin’s Q is its computational simplicity. All of its determinants are 
retrievable from existing data sources such as, for example, the Compustat database. 
Tobin’s Q, however, is not without its critics. First, market value may not reflect the 
marginal cost of capital, but instead may reflect the average cost of capital. In that case, firm 
value may not be properly captured by Tobin’s Q. See Joao F. Gomes, Financing 
Investment, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1263, 1264-65 (2001); see also Eric B. Lindenberg & 
Stephen A. Ross, Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial Organization, 54 J. BUS. 1, 8-9 (1981). 
Second, Tobin’s Q may not reflect an accurate valuation of the firm due to market 
irrationality. Irrationality could be significant if investor sentiment drives valuations in the 
stock market. See Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the Market Matter? Stock Prices and 
the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms, 118 Q.J. ECON. 969, 969-70 (2003). With those 
caveats in mind, Tobin’s Q is still a commonly accepted measure of firm valuation, 
including within the scholarship on corporate governance. See, e.g., Gompers et al., supra 
note 46, at 126 (“Our valuation measure is Tobin’s Q, which has been used for this purpose 
in corporate-governance studies . . . .”). 
158 R&D is a standard measure of innovation. See Edwin Mansfield, R&D and 
Innovation: Some Empirical Findings, in R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 127, 127 (Zvi 
Griliches ed., 1984), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10047.pdf [http://perma.cc/5JRR-
Z6YR]. 
159 See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 1: Levels of Golden Parachutes, Dual-Class Stock, 
Staggered Boards, and Poison Pills 
 
 
 
As Figure 1 shows, staggered boards and poison pills gradually declined 
during 2009-2012,160 a finding that is consistent with the decline in defenses 
that other studies have found.161 One explanation for the drop is the growing 
importance of institutional investors and increased shareholder activism.162 
 
160 The level of Staggered and Pill went from around 52% and 27%, respectively, in 
2009 to around 43% and 14%, respectively, in 2012.  
161 See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect 
Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 627-28 
(2013) (reporting that the number of S&P 500 companies with a staggered board declined 
by more than 50% from 2000 to 2012); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 29, at 31 (finding that, 
after 2006, the ratio of firms in their panel with a staggered board steadily declined until 
reaching about 47% in 2011). 
162 See Patrick S. McGurn, Classification Cancels Corporate Accountability, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 839, 839-40 (2002) (“Over the past decade, executives have seen successive doomsday 
takeover defenses, including . . . poison pills . . . wither in the face of a rising tide of 
investor activism.”); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing 
Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
475, 477 (“The ability of . . . institutional actors to coordinate at a much lower cost changes 
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Unsurprisingly, a key focus of shareholders has been on removing defenses in 
light of studies (like those introducing the GIM-Index and the E-Index) that 
found them to entrench management and cause a drop in firm value.163 
By contrast, chute levels marginally increased over the same period. From 
2009 to 2012, Parachute increased from approximately 80% to 82%. One 
possible explanation is the competition among firms for executive talent. Firms 
typically benefit from competition. For talent, it generally helps by allocating 
the best managers to the largest and most complex firms.164 However, the 
 
the collective action equation and rejuvenates a shareholder activism that depends on voting 
as a credible mechanism for shareholder influence . . . .”). 
163 See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. We note that recent studies call into 
question the standard interpretation of evidence in existing empirical studies, finding that 
insulation measures can increase firm value over time. In a recent paper, Cremers and Sepe 
show that the negative cross-sectional impact of staggered boards on firm value is reversed 
in the time-series. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 29, at 5-7. More specifically, using a 
comprehensive sample from 1978–2011, they show that firms that adopted a staggered 
board increased in value, while de-staggering was associated with a decrease in value over 
time. See id. at 38-42. In the finance companion to this study, the authors also show that the 
decision to adopt a staggered board seems to be endogenous and related to an ex ante drop 
in firm value. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 
5, 21-22 (July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364165 [http://perma.cc/ZZ2G-UQAK] (“Our time series and 
portfolio analyses suggest that the negative correlation identified in prior cross-sectional 
studies of the association of staggered boards with firm value might be due to reverse 
causality.”). As a potential explanation of those results, they argue that staggered boards 
may promote long-term value creation by serving as a credible commitment device against 
short-term shareholder interference. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 29, at 7-8, 52-53. In 
another recent paper, Popadak shows that stronger shareholder governance may 
significantly affect a firm’s corporate culture, producing greater results-orientation but 
lesser customer-focus, integrity, and collaboration. See Jillian Popadak, A Corporate Culture 
Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value 1 (Oct. 25, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345384 [http://perma.cc/AQL5-
MVTU] (“[I]n contrast to the paradigm that stronger governance is good, firm value 
declines 1.4% through this corporate culture channel,”). Consistent with a positive link 
between governance and value, Popadak shows that stronger shareholder governance may 
result in reduced corporate gains, as intangible assets associated with customer satisfaction 
and employee integrity deteriorate. Id. at 3, 26, 28-30. Popadak also shows that greater 
shareholder governance causes managers to concentrate on easy-to-observe benchmarks at 
the expense of harder-to-measure intangibles, even though doing so may not be in the firm’s 
best long-term interests. See id. at 3. 
164 See Antonio Falato et al., Which Skills Matter in the Market for CEOs? Evidence 
from Pay for CEO Credentials 3 (Feb. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699384 [http://perma.cc/7SYK-
CZLU]. The correlation between CEO pay and firm size, see Alex Edmans et al., A 
Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
4881, 4882-83 (2009); Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So 
Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49, 50-51 (2008), is consistent with the role that competition plays 
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competition for talent also creates an adverse selection problem.165 Absent 
protection against the risk of a change in investment strategy, talented 
managers (who are more likely to make specific investments) will prefer firms 
with a lower likelihood of a change in control.166 Those firms, however, tend to 
outperform their peers and, therefore, are less in need of talented managers.167 
Conversely, a firm with a higher probability of takeover—one that is more 
likely to underperform—tends to be less appealing to talented managers. The 
calculus is simple. A manager whose specific investment is less valuable is less 
concerned with future expropriation because she has less to lose. Firms in 
greater need of talented managers end up with less talented managers, and vice 
versa.168 Chutes help address this imbalance by assisting underperforming 
firms in a competitive market to attract more talented managers. They do so, 
because—notwithstanding the greater likelihood of a change in control, such as 
 
in sorting managerial candidates. The relationship, however, may only be a recent 
phenomenon; executive compensation remained fairly flat from the mid-1940s to the mid-
1970s, even though firms grew considerably over the same period. See Carola Frydman & 
Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 
1936–2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2100 (2010). 
165 Adverse selection arises when an agent has hidden knowledge of her own charac-
teristics or value. Nobel laureate George Akerlof introduced the classic treatment of adverse 
selection in the products market. Under conditions of uncertainty, a buyer does not know for 
how much a seller is willing to sell a good, in other words, whether the seller’s type is 
“good” or “bad,” and vice versa. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970). Akerlof shows that, 
when the number of bad sellers (or buyers) is relatively high, buyers (or sellers) may prefer 
to stop exchanging goods, leading to a market breakdown. See id. Other examples of 
adverse selection include (i) when a firm hires a worker and does not know the worker’s 
ability, see Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 356 (1973), and (ii) 
when an insurance company insures a car and the driver has private information about her 
risk propensity, see Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 
629, 630-32 (1976). 
166 See Viral Acharya et al., Competition for Managers, Corporate Governance and 
Incentive Compensation 1-2 (Feb. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786703 [http://perma.cc/MBV8-
89BC]. 
167 See Alex Edmans et al., The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices 
on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN. 933, 934 (2012) (empirically confirming the existence of a “trigger 
effect” relating to future takeover activity, with lower-valued firms more likely to attract 
acquisition bids, and vice versa).  
168 A similar problem arises if a chute’s payments are subject to limitations. If firms that 
need talented managers cannot increase the level of insurance (the chute’s payments), they 
will be less likely to attract talented managers. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that 
firms with lower performance offer significant chute payments. The amounts reflect a 
rational market determination of the level of insurance required to provide managers of 
those firms with the right incentives to optimally invest their human capital.  
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when takeover defenses decline—they reduce the risk to CEOs that their 
specific investments will later be expropriated.169 The increase in chutes may 
not be as significant as the decline in antitakeover devices, because when firms 
compete for talent, market demand may make it more likely that boards will 
favor features, like chutes, that appeal to prospective CEOs, regardless of 
whether or not the firm has antitakeover devices.170 
Finally, we note that Dual appears to be stationary at around six percent 
over the entire 2009-2012 period. The observation period is limited, but 
appears to suggest that whether or not there are staggered boards or poison 
pills is unaffected by whether or not there is a controlling shareholder. Since 
chutes also show only limited change, it is unclear what (if any) relationship 
exists with Dual. Part of the reason for the limited change may be due to how 
long it takes to move from Dual to circumstances when there is no longer dual-
class stock or a controlling shareholder. As noted before, part of the reason 
may also reflect the market demand for senior executives that favor 
employment terms, like chutes, regardless of the likelihood of takeover. 
In the next Section, we look at the association between protective features 
and CEO compensation. As described earlier, we expect that managers who do 
not have the benefit of those features are more likely to be compensated 
upfront against the risk of future expropriation. To some extent, upfront 
compensation may act as a substitute for chutes, but it raises its own set of 
governance concerns that make it a less efficient alternative. 
B. Chutes and CEO Compensation 
In order to verify whether protective features may affect CEO 
compensation, we relate average annual CEO compensation over 2009-2012 
with average annual CEO compensation for firms without (i) chutes, (ii) dual-
class stock, (iii) a staggered board or a poison pill, or (iv) any of those features. 
We then calculate the incremental premium paid to CEOs in each case.171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169  See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
170  See infra notes 174-77, 187-87 and accompanying text. 
171  We compute the compensation premium as follows: The difference between (i) 
Average Compensation (if Feature X is not present), and (ii) Average Compensation, 
divided by Average Compensation, where Feature X is Parachute, Dual, Governance, or all 
of these protective features. 
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Figure 2: CEO Compensation Premiums 
 
 
As Figure 2 shows, during 2009-2012, the compensation premium paid to 
CEOs of firms without a chute (No Parachute) ranged between -1% and 23%. 
Those firms saw an increase in their compensation premiums until 2011, 
followed by a drop in 2012. It is unclear why the drop took place in 2012. We 
note, however, that Say-on-Pay first became operative during the 2011 proxy 
season, and the drop in compensation premiums may have partly resulted from 
that new requirement.172 
Compensation premiums for firms without dual-class stock (No Dual) or a 
staggered board or poison pill (No Governance) remained fairly constant. For 
No Dual firms, the compensation premium was around 8% in 2009 and around 
5.5% in 2012. For No Governance firms, the compensation premium was 
around 21-22% in both 2009 and 2012. 
Most remarkably, consider what occurred when a firm had no protective 
features at all (No Protection). Managers in those firms faced the greatest risk 
 
172 See Say On Pay Makes Its Debut in the 2011 Season, COOLEY LLP (July 28, 2011), 
https://www.cooley.com/say-on-pay-makes-its-debut-in-the-2011-proxy-season 
[https://perma.cc/92MM-L28Y]; supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the 
regulatory background). 
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that their specific investments would later be expropriated due to a change in 
the firm’s investment policies. For those firms, unsurprisingly, CEO 
compensation premiums ranged from 29% to above 90%—reaching their apex 
in 2011, when the average CEO compensation in a No Protection firm was 
almost twice the average compensation of CEOs in our sample. The compen-
sation premium dropped to approximately 37.5% in 2012. Like before, we 
suspect the drop is partly attributable to implementation of Say-on-Pay voting 
during the 2011 proxy season.173 
Recall that, when firms compete for talent, market demand may begin to set 
the terms on which managers are hired, making it more likely that boards will 
favor features, like chutes, that appeal to CEOs.174 Firms without those 
features—especially underperforming firms, which face an increased risk of a 
change in control—are more likely to end up with less-talented managers 
unless they can compensate for the risk of expropriation.175 Our analysis shows 
that CEO compensation is higher in the absence of chutes or other protective 
features, consistent with what we would expect in a competitive market.176 The 
absence of each protective feature results in an increase in executive pay and 
so, in that respect, we may find some degree of substitution across each 
feature. Each helps to minimize the amount of upfront executive compensation 
a firm must otherwise pay. Chutes, however, have an added value—they 
encourage a CEO to specifically invest in the firm without fear of later 
expropriation. Compensation premiums, by contrast, might not be able to serve 
that end. Chutes, therefore, appear to be a valuable and more efficient 
governance feature that assist in promoting specific investments, especially in 
innovation.177 We empirically verify this theoretical prediction in the next 
 
173 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.  
176 By design, compensation premiums in our analysis capture total compensation, 
including salary and contingent compensation. Accordingly, in light of the greater weight 
given today to contingent incentives, such as restricted stock and stock options, much of the 
increase in compensation may reflect an increase in contingent compensation. 
177 See Williamson, supra note 103, at 1217 n.60 (noting that the risk of expropriation 
can be addressed through higher salaries or chutes “[i]f the efficiency properties of the latter 
are superior, as they arguably are”). Chutes may be less costly in assuring a CEO that she 
will receive the value of her specific investment. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in 
Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 377 N.W.2d 593, 604 n.12 (Wis. 1985), when 
upholding a chute that was negotiated during a friendly merger: 
It is conceivable that [the target] could have purchased corporate loyalty by increasing 
the salaries of key employees, thereby increasing the employees’ opportunity costs for 
leaving [the target]. However, [the target] may have felt that the least expensive 
method to purchase such loyalty was through the stipulated damages mechanism. The 
former method would require perhaps significant salary increases to seventy 
employees; the latter would require payment of the stipulated amount only upon a 
breach of a given contract.  
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Section, measuring the impact of chutes on firm value and, in particular, with 
respect to firms more engaged in innovation. 
C. Golden Parachutes, Innovation, and Firm Value 
Column 1 in Table 1 below tests the stand-alone and interacted impact of 
Parachute on Firm Value (measured using Tobin’s Q). Column 2 computes the 
interacted effect of R&D—a standard proxy for innovation178—and Parachute 
on Firm Value. 
All our regressions in Table 1 include controls for year and firm fixed 
effects. On the one hand, using year fixed effects is important because 
Parachute levels tend to be highly correlated from year to year, and firm value 
in any given year may be affected by variables other than Parachute.179 On the 
other hand, using firm fixed effects allows us to perform a time-series analysis, 
which helps mitigate endogeneity concerns.180 Governance features, such as 
adopting a chute, may be endogenous responses to the circumstances in which 
a firm finds itself.181 In light of this possibility, the risk exists that (i) changes 
in firm performance correlate with adoption of a chute, but may be caused by 
another firm characteristic (a “specification problem”),182 or (ii) changes in 
firm performance may determine whether a firm adopts a chute, rather than the 
other way around (a “simultaneity problem”).183 Including firm fixed effects 
helps reduce both of those concerns, since it enables us to compare average 
firm value before and after a change in Parachute.184 Further, we exclude from 
our sample firms that have outstanding shares of dual-class stock, since the 
 
178 See Mansfield, supra note 158, at 127 (outlining the author’s empirical findings 
regarding R&D, innovation, and technological change). 
179 In any given year there could be omitted variables that co-determine the association 
between the independent variable (Parachute) and the dependent variable (Firm Value). 
Controlling for year fixed effects is standard in panel data empirical analysis. See, e.g., 
Cremers et al., supra note 163, at 16-17, 46 tbl.3 (including year fixed effects and 
explaining their importance). 
180 Endogeneity, in this context, refers to the possibility that changes in dependent vari-
ables correlate with the presence of a Parachute but may not be caused by the presence of a 
Parachute, or that the changes may be the cause of why a board grants a Parachute rather 
than the opposite. If either is true, the regression model we employ and the estimates we 
obtain may not be reliable. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 228, 259 (7th 
ed. 2012). 
181 See Adams et al., supra note 106, at 59.  
182 See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” 
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1255-56 (2003). 
183 See id.  
184 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND 
PANEL DATA 668 (2005) (“The time series dimension . . . allows us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the cross section units, and to estimate certain dynamic 
relationships.”). 
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protection that managers enjoy when a controlling shareholder is present could 
bias our results on the effect of Parachute.185 
Table 1 estimates the standalone impact of Parachute (Column 1) and the 
interacted effect of Parachute and R&D (Column 2) on Firm Value (measured 
by Tobin’s Q) for the period 2009-2011. In each regression, the following 
additional control variables are included but not shown: Assets, Leverage 
(measured using book value), and Capital Expenditure (as a percentage of firm 
assets). Year and firm fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. T-statistics (using their absolute values) are shown 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The statistical significance of 
the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, 
respectively.186 
Table 1: Firm Value and Golden Parachutes: 
Interaction of Golden Parachutes with Innovation 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES: Firm Value Firm Value 
   
Parachute 0.0200 0.01981 
 (0.57) (0.61) 
R&D 0.1273*** -0.1697*** 
  (24.14) (-4.52) 
Parachute × R&D  0.2995*** 
 
  (7.95) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3771 3771 
R-squared Adj. 0.869 0.870 
 
185 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
186  This means that the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that an independent variable has 
no impact on a dependent variable) cannot be rejected with a probability of 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. In statistics, when the significance level is above 10%, it is standard to 
consider the result to be statistically insignificant or uninformative. 
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 As shown by Table 1, Column 1, the impact of Parachute on Firm Value is 
positive, although statistically insignificant. This result is most likely 
attributable to the poor time variation of Parachute in our sample.187 Although 
statistical insignificance does not allow us to draw a conclusion on the 
efficiency of Parachute, the positive association of Parachute and Firm Value 
still suggests that adopting a chute is unlikely to have caused a drop in firm 
value during our sample period. In fact, our analysis confirms that adopting a 
chute seems to add value to firms more engaged in innovation, consistent with 
our theoretical analysis. Indeed, as shown by Column 2 of Table 1, the 
regression of Firm Value against Parachute interacted with R&D is positive 
and statistically significant. Economically, we find that when a firm that is 
more engaged in innovation (as proxied by an increase in R&D by one 
standard deviation) adopts a Parachute, the positive impact of Parachute on 
Firm Value is around 13% higher (that is, 0.2995 – 0.1697). Although we 
cannot conclude that chutes are always beneficial, this result suggests that 
chutes are valuable in more innovative firms. 
Although our results suggest that chutes enhance firm performance in firms 
with more specific investment, less clear is whether a chute’s terms are 
optimal. Some portion of the chute may be the result of competition to hire the 
best CEO. Candidates may be able to use that competition to their own 
advantage to enhance compensation by threatening to accept a competitor’s 
offer. As a result, a chute’s terms may provide a manager with “excessive 
rent,” increasing a chute’s amount while not increasing the manager’s 
incentives to undertake more specific investments. Whether or not that is the 
case is a question left open for future empirical research. 
 
187 In a previous version of this Article, we also included 2007 and 2008 Risk Metrics 
data in our analysis since we were unaware of the potential problems with this data. See 
supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. That analysis delivered stronger results on the 
efficiency of Parachute. More specifically, in regressions including the same controls as in 
Table 1, we found that: (i) in the cross-section, firms that adopted a chute were on average 
associated with a reduction in Firm Value of around 11.1%; (ii) in the time series, this result 
was reversed with Parachute having a positive and statistically significant effect on Firm 
Value of around 5.8%. Subject to the accuracy of the 2007 and 2008 data, this inconsistency 
in the cross-section and time-series results induced us to think that the cross-section results 
could have been biased by a simultaneity problem. Specifically, this problem would arise if 
having low firm value caused some firms to adopt a chute, perhaps due to the greater 
likelihood of takeover or in order to attract talented CEOs (both facts consistent with our 
theoretical hypothesis). The end result would be that firms with chutes would tend to have 
lower firm values—even though chutes were not the cause. This problem is mitigated in the 
time-series analysis, since this analysis tests the impact of Parachute on Firm Value over 
time within the same firms. 
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* * * 
The upshot of this Part is that chutes encourage specific investment by 
managers, particularly in support of innovation, that enhance firm value. 
Specifically, our analyses suggest that: 
i. In recent years a decline in staggered boards and poison pills occurred, 
while chute levels remained persistently high. This is consistent with our 
theoretical proposition that those features act as partial substitutes in 
providing managers with the protection required to incentivize specific 
investments;188 
ii. Chutes, dual-class stock (controlling shareholders), staggered boards, 
and poison pills are associated with lower executive compensation, 
confirming that chutes, antitakeover devices, and pay-for-performance 
incentives are to some extent interchangeable in promoting specific 
investment;189 and 
iii. Chutes appear to be efficient in firms with more investments in 
innovation, since the adoption of a chute by these firms is associated 
with higher firm value.190 
III. RETHINKING CHUTES 
In Part I we showed theoretically how chutes encourage specific investment 
by assuring managers they will benefit from the long-term value of their work, 
even if there is a later change in control.191 This central proposition is 
consistent with the empirical results presented in Part II. Nevertheless, an 
analysis of chutes as a value-enhancing governance device has been largely 
missing from the corporate law scholarship. The principal focus, instead, has 
been on the risk that chutes may constitute excessive compensation—pay 
without performance—and their potential effect on takeovers when a change in 
control is imminent.192 Both approaches miss the mark. 
The first underestimates the risk of expropriation that managers face when 
deciding to explore new, firm-specific investment opportunities, as well as the 
distortions in managerial incentives that then result.193 Chutes can better 
address that risk than pay-for-performance, which helps explain the value to 
firm performance of seemingly outrageously large chute payments. The second 
portrays chutes, dual-class stock, staggered boards, and poison pills as 
entrenchment devices that provide incremental protection against takeovers, 
 
188 See supra Section II.A. 
189 See supra Section II.B, notes 134, 143-44 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra Section II.C. 
191 See supra notes 118-19, 188-90 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (explaining that a manager is less 
likely to explore new, uncontested investments if they do not think they will be rewarded or 
recognized for the success of the long-term investments). 
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but without taking into account their role in encouraging specific investment 
and reducing the expected costs of chutes.194 Each mechanism limits a 
manager’s future risk of expropriation, but chutes provide a more direct means 
of doing so. 
Most courts distinguish between chutes and takeover protections.195 Rather 
than the heightened standard of review to which takeover protections are 
subject, a board’s decision to grant a chute typically benefits from the business 
judgment rule,196 unless the chute is enacted for defensive purposes.197 In 
general, how a court assesses a chute depends on whether its adoption was 
 
194 See supra notes 121-22, 144-48 and accompanying text. 
195 See RADIN, supra note 10, at 3508 nn.7539-40, 3311-12 (noting that some courts have 
determined that chutes do not constitute defensive measures).  
196 See, e.g., Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., Civ. Act. Nos. 10173, 10189 
(consolidated), 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, at *16-17 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 1988) (holding that 
chutes approved by a committee of independent directors are “prima facie subject to the 
protections of the business judgment rule”); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Cont’l, Inc., Civ. 
Act. No. 9813, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 61, at *6, *20 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (refusing to 
grant a preliminary injunction enjoining chutes whose provisions were “particularly trouble-
some,” stating “[e]ven when a compensation decision directly benefits directors, if the 
decision is approved by a committee of disinterested directors, it is afforded the protection 
of the business judgment rule”); cf. Cox Enters., Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., Case No. 6:04-
cv-698-Orl-28KRS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101401, at *32-41 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2008) 
(finding the granting of chutes to be corporate waste, since “there was no reasonable 
relationship between the services rendered [by the beneficiaries] . . . and the benefits 
received” by the target). Recall that chutes may also be triggered by a change in board 
composition. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. A chute, however, may be 
impermissible if its terms are so burdensome as to coerce shareholders to vote for a 
particular slate of directors. See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, Civ. Act. No. 19191, 
2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002). 
197 See, e.g., Nault v. XTRA Corp., Civ. Act. No. 91-11151-Z, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10512, at *9 (D. Mass. Jul. 9, 1992) (denying a motion for summary judgment on claims 
seeking to enforce a chute since, in light of other defensive measures adopted by the former 
board, one could infer that the chute was an entrenchment device); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak 
Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232-34 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff’d mem., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(distinguishing between employment benefits awarded before or after a tender offer was 
announced, and finding under the circumstances that the chutes satisfied the Unocal 
standard); Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, Civ. Act. No. 14527, Civ. A. No. 14460, Civ. Act. No. 
14787, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47, at *10 n.4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1997) (stating that “[w]hen a 
board provides severance benefits for a defensive purpose, its action is subject to enhanced 
scrutiny” under Unocal); Tate & Lyle, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 61, at *20 (using the Unocal 
standard, upholding chutes adopted “in a good faith response to possible future hostile 
tender offer advances”). Note that a small number of states provide that, following com-
mencement of a tender offer, the target firm may not “enter into or amend, directly or 
indirectly, agreements containing provisions, whether or not dependent on the occurrence of 
any event or contingency, that increase, directly or indirectly, the current or future 
compensation of any officer or director.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2705 (2013); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.255(3) (2014) (using the exact same language).  
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reasonable under the circumstances, with no single factor being dispositive.198 
In judging reasonableness, however, courts have considered the amount to be 
paid,199 and consistent with this Article’s analysis of chutes as insurance 
against job loss,200 whether the chute is triggered upon a change in control (a 
single-trigger) or, more favorably, also upon the manager’s termination or 
constructive discharge (a double-trigger).201 In addition, several courts have 
noted a preference for chutes adopted before a takeover arises202—an 
approach, again, consistent with this Article’s focus on chutes as a credible 
means to encourage specific investment regardless of whether a change in 
control occurs.203 
Nevertheless, the general failure to consider chutes outside the takeover 
context, coupled with rhetoric about excessive chute payments, has had 
important consequences. Two, in particular, are worth noting. The first is the 
negative view of proxy advisors on the adoption of chutes. The other is the 
federal enactment of Say-on-Golden-Parachute rules that subject chutes in 
public companies to a non-binding shareholder vote,204 but provide for 
ineffective disclosure requirements. We address each point in this Part, 
assessing them in light of the positive effect of chutes on firm performance, 
and recommending changes, consistent with this Article’s analysis, that 
properly reflect the value of chutes in corporate governance.205 
A. Proxy Advisor Recommendations 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) is considered to be the most 
influential proxy advisor in the United States.206 Institutional investors 
regularly look to ISS and other proxy advisors for direction on how to vote 
their shares, and in some cases, automatically vote them in line with ISS 
recommendations.207 To assist in advising institutions on investment and 
 
198 See RADIN, supra note 10, at 3514. 
199 See, e.g., Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1467-68 (11th Cir. 1989); Buckhorn, 
656 F. Supp. at 232-35; Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 1272 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989); Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., Civ. Act. No. 8675, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 483, 
at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1986). 
200 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
201 See RADIN, supra note 10, at 3513 n.7552. 
202 See id. at 3514 n.7555. 
203 See infra Section III.B. 
204 See Cremers et al., supra note 45, at 40-41 (discussing why subjecting the adoption of 
golden parachutes to shareholder approval might be desirable).  
205 See infra Sections III.A,  III.B. 
206 See Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Perils of Corporate Governance Indices, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2008) (describing ISS as the “dominant market leader”). 
207 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 889-90 
(2007) (“[ISS] may control a third or more of the shareholder votes.”); see also Charles M. 
Natham & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and Institutional 
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voting decisions,208 ISS has developed corporate governance ratings that 
reflect their view of best practices.209 A recommendation by ISS is estimated to 
be able to shift a vote’s outcome by 6% to 19%,210 with a negative recom-
mendation in an uncontested director’s election being correlated with a 20.3% 
drop in favorable votes.211 
ISS also provides guidance on the non-binding shareholder votes on chutes 
required by the new Say-on-Golden-Parachute rules, discussed below.212 Fea-
tures that may result in ISS recommending a vote213 against a chute include:214 
 
Voting 2-3 (Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1583507 [http://perma.cc/U8QV-TZS7] (“[P]roxy advisory firms . . . have 
developed methodologies to recommend voting positions for all public companies on all 
ballot matters, as well as systems for electronic voting that are used to cast votes on behalf 
of participating institutions . . . .”). 
208 See Rose, supra note 207, at 898-99 (“The for-profit corporate governance industry 
sells corporate governance advice through a number of products, including corporate 
governance ratings and proxy advice.”). 
209 See Bhagat et al., supra note 206, at 1807-08. 
210 See Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2404 (2009) (finding that “a 
negative ISS recommendation is associated with 19% fewer votes” for a director); Stephen 
Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) 
(finding the impact of an ISS recommendation ranges from 6%-13%). 
211 Choi et al., supra note 210, at 886-87. 
212 See infra Section III.B. 
213 Although ISS remains influential, it is less clear how influential it is on Say-on-
Golden-Parachute votes, partly because the new rule has only been in effect since April 25, 
2011, a little over four years. E.g., Vincent A. Vietti, SEC Adopts Final Rules Governing 
Say-On-Pay, Say-On-Frequency, and Golden Parachute Compensation Advisory Votes, FOX 
ROTHSCHILD LLP (Feb. 2011), http://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/sec-adopts-final-
rules-governing-say-on-pay-say-on-frequency-and-golden-parachute-compensation-
advisory-votes/ [http://perma.cc/Z8MV-NW94]. During 2013, there were “a total of 141 
votes on executive compensation packages linked to takeovers, and 86% passed.” Vipal 
Monga, Approval on Golden Parachutes Rose in 2013, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 30, 2013, 
3:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/12/30/approval-on-golden-parachutes-rose-in-
2013/ [http://perma.cc/TRA3-WLB5]. That ratio was greater than the 82% (based on 113 
votes) that passed in 2012. Id. The uptick in approvals was contrary to the greater number of 
ISS negative voting recommendations, which increased (from 20% to 28% of proposals) 
over roughly the same period. See MARGARET BLACK & DAN WETZEL, PEARL MYER & 
PARTNERS, UPDATED: SAY ON GOLDEN PARACHUTE VOTES 3 (2013) [hereinafter PEARL 
MYER], http://www.pearlmeyer.com/Pearl/media/PearlMeyer/ArticlesWhitepapers/PMP-
ART-SOGPUpdate-12-17-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9T3-HD5G]. Notwithstanding 2013, 
over the two-year period following adoption of the Say-on-Golden-Parachute rules, a study 
found that each of the twenty-seven companies that increased the benefits to be awarded 
under its chutes, but with ISS support, received shareholder approval. See SULLIVAN & 
CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 1-2. “On the other hand, five of the 12 companies that 
enhanced [their chutes] and received a negative ISS recommendation, failed their vote.” See 
id. at 1-2 (based on a review of 365 transactions). Also, in line with ISS’s recommendations, 
five proposals to prohibit single-trigger chutes received a majority of votes for the first time 
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i. Single-trigger or modified single-trigger cash severance; 
ii. Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards; 
iii. Excessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus); 
iv. Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable;215 and 
v. Excessive chute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of trans-
action equity value).216 
ISS’s recommendations against the adoption of single-trigger chutes are 
consistent with this Article’s analysis. Recall that a single-trigger obligates the 
target to make a payment only upon a change in control, even if the beneficiary 
remains employed.217 A modified single-trigger obligates the firm to pay the 
beneficiary if she voluntarily terminates employment during a specified period 
following a change in control (typically, the thirteenth month).218 To the extent 
a chute is designed to insure managers against expropriation of the value of 
their specific investment,219 we would expect its payments to be made, not 
 
during the 2014 proxy season. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2014 PROXY SEASON 
REVIEW 17-18 (2014), http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
SC_Publication_2014_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ML2-AXVN] 
(comparing this to zero in 2013 and 2012). Shareholder support averaged 31% for 
compensation-related proposals that ISS recommended and only 5% for proposals that ISS 
opposed. See id.  
214 See generally Alert Letter, Frederic W. Cooke & Co., ISS Releases 2013 Draft Policy 
Changes for Comment 3 (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/10-19-
12_ISS_Releases_2013_Draft_Policy_Changes_For_Comment.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FC5-
WZAM] (describing proposed changes in the ISS policy for evaluating Say-on-Golden-
Parachute proposals). 
215 Due to ISS’s recommendation against tax gross-ups, the number of companies 
providing it is declining. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
216 INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY 
GUIDELINES 54 (2013), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/2014_Policies/ISSUSSummary 
Guidelines2014March12.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ZDF-B5ZM] (listing these five disfavored 
features). Additional features that may negatively influence ISS’s recommendation include 
“[r]ecent amendments that incorporate problematic features” or recent actions that may 
make chutes so attractive as to “influence the outcome of merger agreements that may not 
be in the shareholders’ best interests”; or the target’s assertion that a proposed takeover is 
conditioned on the shareholders approving the chute under the Say-on-Golden-Parachute 
advisory vote. See Frederic W. Cooke & Co., supra note 214 at 3, 5; see also PEARL MEYER, 
supra note 213, at 3. ISS’s recommendations are made on a case-by-case basis. 
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., supra, at 41. Accordingly, an acceptable chute 
generally should be consistent with the listed features, but they are not exclusive. See id. 
217 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
218 This arrangement is intended to ensure that executives stay with the acquired firm for 
a period of time after the transaction closes, following which they may depart or renegotiate 
new employment terms. See MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS LLC, CHANGE-IN-CONTROL 
ARRANGEMENTS 2 (2011), http://www.meridiancp.com/images/uploads/20_ CIC_Severance 
_Arrangements.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VVS-PLE2]. 
219 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
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simply upon a change in control, or an executive’s decision to voluntarily 
resign, but rather upon the beneficiary’s loss of a job—a double-trigger.220 
ISS’s recommendation that chutes adopt a double-trigger is also consistent 
with our analysis. In addition, it is consistent with the trend in chutes, with 
firms (largely due to shareholder pressure) increasingly adopting a double-
trigger.221 However, the limits that ISS recommends on amounts payable under 
a chute are troubling.222 The 3x cap on cash severance is derived from the 
Internal Revenue Code, which imposes a twenty percent excise tax on 
“excessive” chute payments—payments that equal or exceed 3x the 
employee’s base salary—and denies tax deductions to firms that award those 
payments.223 In line with ISS’s recommendations, severance multiples have 
declined over time, from 3x to 2x, although a 3x severance payment is still 
common for CEO chutes.224 Beyond salary multiples, chute payments are also 
assessed by ISS based on the payout amount relative to the equity value of the 
transaction that triggered the payment.225 Of the thirty-five companies whose 
 
220 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; see also COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INV’RS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES ¶ 5.13c (2014), 
http://www.cii.org/files/ciicorporategovernancepolicies/07_08_14_corp_gov_policies.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VPM3-NLTQ] (recommending that any obligation to pay compensation 
following a change in control should be double-triggered); INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. 
INC., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON U.S. COMPENSATION POLICIES 23 (2014), 
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/2014_Policies/ISSUSCompensationFAQs03282014.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2H9N-LZFD] (stating that, “where ISS concludes that a bona-fide change 
in control event has not occurred (e.g., the company’s equity remains outstanding and the 
board is not significantly affected)” it will recommend against approval of a chute payment 
(emphasis added)). 
221 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see also FREDERIC W. COOK & CO, 
EVOLUTION, supra note 70, at 2, 7-8 (finding a “significant shift away from single-trigger 
vesting to double-trigger vesting” for equity awards); PEARL MEYER, supra note 213, at 4 
(showing that the most common rationale for ISS to recommend a vote against a chute is 
adoption of a single-trigger or modified single-trigger). 
222 See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., supra note 216, at 41 (describing as 
excessive any cash severance more than 3x the base salary and bonus). 
223 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (describing the I.R.C. provisions). 
224 See FREDERIC W. COOK & CO, EVOLUTION, supra note 70, at 2, 5 (stating that for 
CEOs, 61% of companies with cash severance have a 3x multiple, and for CFOs, the most 
common multiple was 2x, at 46% of companies with cash severance). Providing CEOs with 
excise tax gross-ups has also declined. See id. at 2, 9-10. 
225 See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., supra note 220, at 24. In a recent survey of 
deals during the two years after Say-on-Golden-Parachute was adopted, CEO chute 
payments triggered by the top ten deals by value (averaging $13.8 billion per deal) were 
0.29% of the target’s equity value and, for all named executive officers (“NEOs”), 0.59%. 
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 2. For the eleventh through twenty-fifth 
largest deals (averaging $4.4 billion per deal), chute payments were 0.85% for CEOs and 
1.71% for NEOs of the target’s equity value, and for the thirty-nine deals that substantively 
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chutes ISS opposed in 2013, chute payouts to named executive officers226 were 
1.87% of the target’s equity value at the median—ranging between 0.04% and 
64.26%.227 
The concern with a cap on chutes is two-fold. First, focusing just on the 
amount the firm must pay when a chute is triggered fails to consider the cost to 
the firm at the time the chute was granted. The expected cost of a chute is a 
small fraction of what the firm actually pays, reflecting the likelihood that the 
firm will pay nothing, as well as the board’s ability to terminate managers who 
underperform.228 Second, the chute’s expected cost is offset by the value of the 
specific investments a manager is more likely to make as a result of having a 
chute. Any assessment of cost, therefore, should also account for the drop in 
firm value that would likely result from the chute’s absence. 
Codifying a 3x cap has created a standard of reasonableness on which 
boards and executives can rely in setting a chute’s terms.229 To the extent the 
cap exceeds the value of a manager’s specific investment, but has congres-
sional (and now ISS) imprimatur, it may result in a windfall to the 
beneficiaries. If the cap falls short of actual value, it may fail to provide 
incentives to executives to invest in the company over the longer-term, causing 
a decline in firm performance. Stated differently, a one-size-fits-all approach to 
assessing a chute’s payout is unlikely to set the right balance for all firms. It 
risks drawing attention away from what the board should be focused on—what 
amount is necessary to encourage value-enhancing, longer-term investment. It 
also redirects that focus to whether a chute meets the ISS guidelines—such as 
the chute’s value at the time of a change in control—rather than to the 
expected cost and value to the firm at the time it was granted. 
In fact, the full effect of a cap may be even more pernicious. To the extent 
that the cap is set by reference to annual pay, boards concerned over ISS 
approval may be inclined to increase pay first, in order to offset the decline in 
chute payments and, second, in order for any chute payments to stay within the 
3x cap. In effect, imposing a cap on chutes encourages the board to pay 
 
enhanced chute payments during the period (averaging $1.9 billion per deal), chute 
payments were 1.56% for CEOs and 3.54% for NEOs. See id. 
226 Say-on-Golden-Parachute requires that disclosure regarding chute payments be made 
for the following NEOs: all individuals serving as the firm’s principal executive officer or 
acting in a similar capacity during the last completed fiscal year (“PEO”), regardless of 
compensation level; all individuals serving as the firm’s principal financial officer or acting 
in a similar capacity during the last completed fiscal year (“PFO”), regardless of compen-
sation level; the firm’s three most highly-compensated executive officers, other than the 
PEO and PFO, who served as executive officers at the end of the last completed fiscal year; 
and up to two additional individuals for whom disclosure would have been provided but for 
the fact that she was not serving as an executive officer at the end of the last completed 
fiscal year. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402 (a)(3), to (t) (2014); see infra Section III.B. 
227 PEARL MEYER, supra note 213, at 6. 
228 See supra notes 121-22, 129 and accompanying text. 
229 See Bress, supra note 55, at 963 n.38. 
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excessive compensation up front, without increasing the CEO’s incentive to 
specifically invest in the firm.230 The result is less efficient governance, 
potentially resulting in an overall decline in firm performance. 
Part of the difficulty with chutes is that the board must assess the quality, 
and the likely value, of a CEO’s specific investment before it has been made. 
Making that determination is difficult. Directors, however, are privy to 
confidential information about the firm and are better able than the 
shareholders to assess a CEO’s actions and their value.231 ISS, by contrast, 
faces the same informational problems as public shareholders and, 
consequently, is less able to evaluate measures such as chutes.232 Nevertheless, 
partly due to public outcry,233 the new Say-on-Golden-Parachute rules require 
a firm to publicly disclose its chutes’ terms and, in some cases, solicit a non-
binding shareholders’ vote. As we discuss in the next Section, those new 
disclosure rules reflect an ineffective approach to assessing chutes—with little 
regard to a chute’s expected cost and the pre-takeover value a chute adds to 
firm performance—which is likely to be more harmful than beneficial. 
B. Say-on-Golden-Parachute Disclosures 
Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act234 requires U.S. public companies to 
conduct a non-binding shareholder advisory vote on chute payouts in 
connection with mergers and other significant corporate transactions that are 
presented to the shareholders for approval. In accordance with the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the SEC subsequently issued Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K,235 which 
requires disclosure of any agreement or understanding (written or unwritten) 
between the target or acquirer and the NEO of each concerning any type of 
compensation (current, deferred, or contingent) based on or otherwise relating 
to the transaction.236 
 
230 In that respect, increasing a manager’s pay in order for chutes to stay within the 3x 
cap is “wasted” compensation, because it is more than what is needed to preserve incentives. 
See TIROLE, supra note 9, at 306 (explaining how there is an optimal wage level that, if 
exceeded in order to compensate for the lack of a reward elsewhere, will result in “wasted” 
money on the part of the investor). Pay is increased, but without also increasing the 
managers’ incentives to exert effort or undertake more specific investment. 
231 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background 
on the emergence of chutes). 
234 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b) (2012)) 
(amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding new Section 14A). 
235 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t) (2014). 
236 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t). Additionally, the SEC adopted rules which require companies 
to provide a shareholder advisory vote on chute arrangements when seeking approval of a 
merger or similar significant corporate transaction, unless they were previously subject to a 
shareholder vote. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(c) (2014). Although the SEC requires disclosure 
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Item 402(t)’s disclosures must be in tabular and narrative form. The table 
must present quantitative disclosure of the elements of compensation that are 
based on or otherwise relate to the subject transaction, separately quantified 
based on specified categories, and the aggregate total compensation for each 
NEO.237 In addition, amounts attributable to single-trigger and double-trigger 
arrangements must be identified by footnote.238 The narrative must include a 
description of any material conditions or obligations applicable to the receipt 
of chute payments, including non-compete, non-solicitation, non-
disparagement, or confidentiality agreements; their duration; and provisions 
regarding waiver or breach.239 Firms must also describe whether the payments 
are lump-sum or annual, the payments’ duration, who will make the payments, 
and any other material factors regarding each agreement.240 
Disclosure that focuses only on amounts to be paid when a chute is triggered 
is misleading in two important respects. First, it focuses on a chute’s payout 
amount without providing information on its value or expected cost at the time 
of grant (which is likely to be a small fraction of the payout amount). As 
explained earlier, beyond its effect on takeovers, a chute may enhance a 
manager’s specific investments in the firm and, in turn, improve the firm’s 
longer-term performance.241 Quantifying the value of specific investments, 
however, is difficult due to the severe asymmetric information problem 
affecting such investments—otherwise the manager would not need a chute in 
the first place. The problem with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute disclosure is 
 
of chute arrangements between an acquirer and the target’s NEOs, those arrangements are 
not required to be subject to a shareholder advisory vote unless the acquirer is the one 
seeking shareholder approval of the transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(2) (2012); see 
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(c).  
237 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402(t)(1), (t)(2). The table must use the following categories: 
cash severance; equity awards that are accelerated or cashed out; pension and nonqualified 
deferred compensation benefit enhancements; perquisites and other personal benefits and 
health and welfare benefits; tax reimbursement (such as tax gross-ups); and any additional 
items not covered in the other columns. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t)(2).  
238 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t)(2), Instruction 5 (2014). 
239 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t)(3). 
240 Id. Note that the SEC amended the requirements for other filings to include com-
parable chute disclosure, including registration statements on Forms S-4 and F-4 (containing 
disclosure relating to mergers and similar transactions) and Schedule 13E-3 filings (for 
going-private transactions). See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on Say on Golden 
Parachute Disclosure and Advisory Votes, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ALERT (Latham & 
Watkins LLP, L.A., Cal.), May 2011 at 1 (listing such filings); see generally Shareholder 
Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Securities Act 
Release No. 9178, Exchange Act Release No. 63,768, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (final rule). In addition, firms must include in their 
annual meeting proxy statements detailed information about payments that they may make 
to NEOs upon termination of employment or in connection with a change in control in 
accordance with Item 402(j) of Regulation S-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(j). 
241 See supra Section II.C, notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
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that it requires the firm to assign a dollar amount to what an NEO will be paid. 
Even if the board tried to balance that disclosure with an assessment of a 
chute’s value, it would be hard-pressed to provide the same level of specificity 
as is required by Regulation S-K in identifying cost. The result is a skewed 
picture of chutes and their value to shareholders. As the courts have found,242 
and implicit in the Say-on-Golden-Parachute vote being advisory, setting a 
chute’s terms is better left to the board’s business judgment. But, in that case, a 
disclosure regime that permits (or directs) the board to balance the costs and 
benefits of a chute—rather than focusing on and mandating how firms 
calculate costs—may be the better approach. 
For example, requiring the board to disclose information about the firm’s 
investment policy and, in particular, its focus on innovation, could help make 
the benefits of a chute more intelligible to public shareholders and enable 
investors to assess the board’s decision ex post—assessing the board’s 
disclosure of soft information on specific investments against longer-term firm 
outcomes as specific investments mature. That disclosure could include 
information on the relationship between a firm’s R&D plans and adoption of a 
chute, making the benefits of a chute in promoting specific investment more 
tangible. Publicly disclosing information about the relationship between the 
firm’s investment policy and a manager’s tenure could also enable 
shareholders to better evaluate a chute, less in relation to the payout amount in 
the event the chute is triggered and more in relation to its value as an ongoing 
governance tool. If a chute’s primary function is promoting specific 
investment, as we argue in this Article, a manager’s tenure may be critical in 
determining whether to grant a chute and on what terms.243 
 
242 See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between 
how courts handle takeovers and chutes). 
243 For example, if a manager decides to incur sunk costs at the beginning of her tenure, 
we might expect an optimal chute payout amount to be higher in the short-term (when the 
market is less able to fully reflect the manager’s private information about her specific 
investments) and lower in the long-term (when the market is more likely to have 
incorporated that information). The intuition is that a chute’s insurance function may be 
more prominent at the beginning of a manager’s tenure, when investments in innovation 
require high sunk costs and information about their value is uncertain. Over time, as those 
investments mature, the quality of the manager’s decisions will become public and, 
consequently, be more likely to be incorporated into share price. See MARKUS K. 
BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 9-10 (2001). 
Accordingly, if the manager does well, the likelihood that her specific investments would 
later be expropriated would decline, reducing the need for a chute (or for a chute whose 
payout is as large as before). This, of course, assumes that each manager’s tenure lasts until 
completion of the relevant project. See Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has 
CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L. REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012) (documenting that, from 1992 
to 2007, for a sample of large U.S. companies, the average CEO turnover was less than 
seven years). Alternatively, the board could decide that a chute’s function, even in the long 
term, is to continue to encourage a manager’s ongoing investment. From that perspective, a 
manager’s past successes, even if reflected in current share price, would not provide 
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The disclosure may also consider the relationship between antitakeover 
devices and a chute’s terms. Recall that chutes and antitakeover devices—such 
as staggered boards and poison pills, in addition to dual class stock—are partial 
substitutes in providing protection to managers against the risk of 
expropriation of their specific investments. As illustrated in our numerical 
example, one implication of the relationship is that the expected cost of a chute 
may decrease with the adoption of such devices.244 In addition, existing pay-
for-performance incentives may affect a chute’s terms. Chutes and pay-for-
performance compensation are also partial substitutes. Depending on the firm’s 
circumstances, different combinations of chutes and pay-for-performance may 
be optimal in encouraging specific investments, which the disclosure could 
clarify. Finally, the board could discuss factors beyond the company’s control, 
such as an adverse change in stock market conditions, which could also be 
factors in adopting a chute due to the greater risk of a drop in share price and 
change in control. 
Second, the Say-on-Golden-Parachute disclosure focuses on chutes as 
distinct from other forms of executive compensation. As explained earlier, in 
order to fully assess a chute, the board must consider its relative costs and 
benefits compared to the alternatives.245 Doing so is complex and not easily 
measurable. Attempting to do so through mandatory public disclosure may 
lead boards astray—substituting what “looks best” for what is more likely to 
enhance firm performance, particularly to the extent the disclosure influences 
how ISS and the shareholders assess the directors’ actions. 
Part of this problem may be addressed through the Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis (“CD&A”), a required part of a company’s annual 
proxy statement.246 According to the SEC’s rules, the CD&A is intended “to 
provide to investors material information that is necessary to an understanding 
of the [company’s] compensation policies and decisions,”247 focusing on “the 
most important factors relevant to analysis of those policies and decisions.”248 
The CD&A is the principal means for the company to explain to shareholders 
how senior managers’ compensation is determined.249 Among other items, 
 
sufficient protection against expropriation of her future investments—whose details both the 
board and managers may not want to reveal publicly for competitive or other practical 
reasons. Managers would continue to be interested in having a large chute, since the market 
still would not fully incorporate the value of their prospective investments in share price.  
244 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
245 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (explaining how many tend to 
overlook a chute’s benefits and instead only notice the cost of a chute when it is triggered).  
246 See Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 8 (2014) (setting forth the 
requirements for the Compensation of Directors and Executive Officers (CD&A) portion). 
247 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b), Instruction 1 (2014). 
248 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b), Instruction 3 (2014). 
249 See, e.g., CFA INST., COMPENSATION DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS TEMPLATE, at v (2d. 
ed. 2015), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2015.n4.1 [http://perma.cc/QQ2P-
SN49]. 
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firms are encouraged to describe the business context within which executive 
pay was determined, how corporate and individual performance were taken 
into account, and the basis for allocating compensation across the various types 
of awards.250 Consequently, through the CD&A, a firm can explain how it 
balances a chute’s terms against other compensation, such as a compensation 
premium. It should come as no surprise then that, in setting pay, directors 
consider the total mix of pay elements, including, for example, the relationship 
between salary and equity compensation.251 
What the existing CD&A does not address is the relationship between pay-
for-performance, chutes, and antitakeover devices.252 As noted before, it is 
difficult to analyze the effect of a chute on firm performance with the same 
precision as calculating its total payout.253 It may also do the board little good 
to try doing so in the face of an ISS standard that assesses chutes relative to the 
beneficiary’s annual pay and the target’s equity value.254 The result, again, is 
disclosure that is skewed against chutes—providing a detailed analysis of their 
costs, but without providing a complete picture of their benefits. 
* * * 
A solution to the current approach to chutes must address problems arising 
from ISS’s guidelines for chutes and the SEC’s disclosure requirements. Each 
is related to the other—ISS makes its determinations based on its view of 
corporate best practices, which influences how shareholders (and the board) 
are likely to assess compensation,255 and the SEC’s disclosure requirements are 
focused more on the costs of a chute’s payout than on its positive effect on 
firm performance.256 In order to address both, we recommend the following 
three changes: 
i. Institutional shareholders should consider a chute’s expected cost at 
the time of grant, rather than just its payout amount, and most importantly, the 
positive effect of chutes on firm value. They should urge ISS (and other proxy 
advisors) to take those effects into account when assessing a chute’s terms. 
 
250 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b). 
251 See ISS CORP. SERVS., STOCKING UP: POST-CRISIS TRENDS IN U.S. EXECUTIVE PAY 2–6 
(2012), http://www.isscorporateservices.com/sites/default/files/images/ISS_WhitePaper_ 
Stocking_Up.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YGC-56EK] (considering the interaction among various 
pay elements). 
252 We describe that relationship supra in Section II.B. 
253 See supra note 241 and accompanying text (explaining how, comparatively, the 
benefits of a manager’s specific investments cannot be as easily measured as calculating the 
dollar value of a chute’s payout). 
254 See supra notes 223-27, 241 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text (explaining how ISS influences 
shareholders’ opinions on manager compensation). 
256 See supra note 241-42 and accompanying text (explaining how disclosure 
requirements focus only on the cost of a chute without regard to the chute’s benefits). 
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Using an artificial cut-off—like 3x salary—makes little sense, particularly in 
light of the incentive it creates to increase salary in lieu of a chute’s payout.257 
Investors should have a significant interest in changing the ISS analysis, 
consistent with this Article’s recommendations, since a more complete review 
of chutes is likely to have a positive effect on firm performance. 
ii. The current disclosure requirements for chutes and other executive 
compensation should be supplemented to permit the board to provide an 
analysis of the effect of antitakeover devices and other factors on a chute’s 
terms. It will be difficult for a board to precisely define the relationship among 
them, and directors may be concerned with liability for statements that are later 
challenged. In order to address that concern, a safe harbor should be adopted 
for that portion of a firm’s disclosure. Doing so is not without precedent. The 
new safe harbor would be similar to the current safe harbor for forward-
looking statements—which, among other things, limits liability to the extent 
the statement is “identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied 
by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could 
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking 
statement.”258 A similar safe harbor around a firm’s discussion of non-
compensatory factors that affect chute (and other compensation) arrangements 
would serve a similar purpose—namely, to encourage important disclosure 
without fear of later liability in light of its uncertain nature. 
iii. More generally, a new approach needs to be adopted regarding how 
we assess chutes and their value, including the indices that are commonly used 
as measures of good corporate governance.259 The board should be expected to 
justify a chute’s terms and to do so, less in relation to payout in the event the 
chute is triggered, and more in relation to its value as an ongoing governance 
tool especially with respect to the firm’s investment policies. Part of the need 
for change may arise from the traditional view of chutes as simply antitakeover 
devices, without taking account of their positive effect on managers’ specific 
investments.260 Part of it may be due to the traditional focus—which continues 
to be embodied in the ISS analysis and SEC rules—on chute payouts and the 
effect of chutes at or about the time of a change in control.261 And part of it 
 
257 See supra note 230 and accompanying text (explaining how firms waste money when 
they compensate for the lack of a chute by increasing a manager’s salary). 
258 See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A(c)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012); 
see also SEC Rule 175 (Liability for Certain Statements by Issuers), 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 
(2014) (explaining that forward-looking statements that meet the rule’s requirements shall 
be deemed not to be, among others, “an untrue statement of a material fact, a statement false 
or misleading with respect to any material fact, an omission to state a material fact necessary 
to make a statement not misleading”).  
259 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (arguing that the current indices only 
reflect factors that are temporally related to a chute’s trigger while leaving out other relevant 
indices). 
260 See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text. 
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may reflect market demand for strong CEOs, which has recently driven up the 
number of firms that have adopted chutes.262 Combining the three factors 
suggests that the standard framing around chutes, if it was ever complete, now 
fails to fully reflect their impact on corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
CONCLUSION 
Chutes, unintentionally, are like a good card trick. The often-large payouts 
draw the audience’s attention to when a chute is triggered, when the real 
“magic”—the chute’s support of specific investment, particularly in 
innovation, and increase in firm performance—has already occurred, perhaps 
years earlier. As a result, most corporate law scholarship has been misplaced. 
Chutes provide comfort that standard pay-for-performance cannot, assuring 
managers will realize the long-term value of their work even if the firm is 
acquired, and as a result, providing incentives to managers to specifically 
invest in the firm. That investment is essential to creating and sustaining firm 
value over time.263 From that perspective, chutes, controlling shareholders, 
staggered boards, and poison pills are partial substitutes—promoting specific 
investment rather than simply insulating a firm’s directors and managers from 
shareholder control.264 To that extent, the approach taken to date in assessing 
chutes—by corporate law scholars, as well as by ISS and the SEC disclosure 
rules265—must be reconsidered. It may also indicate the need to begin to 
reassess the portion of the GIM-Index and the E-Index that relates to chutes.266 
Less clear is whether this has always been the case. At the end of the day, 
the importance of chutes to firm performance may simply reflect a trend away 
from their traditional role as an antitakeover device. But we think not. Specific 
investment in innovation has long been important to firm performance. We 
would expect a responsible board to continue to look to find ways to encourage 
that investment. Chutes have become a targeted means for firms to protect 
managers and encourage specific investment. The question remains, however, 
the extent to which chutes enhance firm value, and, due to variability in their 
terms, which features of chutes are most important in encouraging specific 
investment and innovation. We leave that question open for future research. 
 
 
262 See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text (explaining how firms create chutes, 
among other reasons, to attract the most talented managers). 
263 See supra Section II.C, notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 255-61 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.  
